أباكاه فوريكس تيرماسوك كونسيل

إدوتك هو الاستشارات العلمية التي تقدم المساعدة التقنية للصناعة وغيرها من الوكالات مساعدتهم على حل المشاكل في مجالات الكيمياء وتكنولوجيا المواد. قد يكون هذا في اتصال مع أنشطة البحث أمبير البحوث والتصنيع والإنتاج أو 8216in الخدمة 8217 الحالات. وقد شاركت إدوتك في المهام التي قد اتخذت أي شيء من نصف يوم أو ما يصل إلى 3 سنوات لاستكمال الأنشطة النموذجية تشمل التحليل الكيميائي التنظيف الكيميائي / تحديد التلوث والتحكم في التآكل والمواد اختبار التوافق المواد الكيميائية والمواد الكيميائية المواد الإلكترونية كيمياء الدفع الكيمياء والصحة المتعلقة المواد الكيميائية الخطرة التصوير الحراري يمكننا أن نعمل لك بحتة في دور الاستشاريين توفير المعلومات التقنية، أو تصبح تشارك في 8216hands على اختبار العمل 8217 من أجل حل مشكلتك. ونحن نعمل مع مجموعة واسعة من المواد الكيميائية، وسبائك المعادن أمب وكذلك المواد البوليمرية (المطاط والبلاستيك). أنشئت في عام 1998، إدوتك يعمل للعملاء بدءا من الشركات الصغيرة جدا بدء من خلال المنظمات الرئيسية مثل وزارة الدفاع البريطانية ووكالة الفضاء الأوروبية. لدينا عملاء في الخارج في العديد من البلدان الأوروبية وكذلك الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية. لذلك مهما كنت تعرف أو كنت don8217t تعرف عن الكيمياء والمواد، إذا كنت بحاجة إلى بعض المساعدة، يرجى الاتصال بنا. في حين تم بذل كل جهد ممكن لضمان المعلومات المقدمة على هذا الموقع هو دقيق، لا تقبل أي مسؤولية عن أي أخطاء قد تكون موجودةباستخدامها في نظرية الفوركس أكتا 620 أكتا بينابيسان فيلم 2002 دمج جميع التعديلات حتى 1 يناير 2006 سيكسين 42 أكتا بينابيسان فيلم 2002 تيادا كوس أتاو غانتيروجي يانغ بيربانغكيت داريبادا بينيتان بوله ديداباتكان 42. 8220 تيادا سورانغ بون بوله، دلام أبا-أبا بروزينغ دي هادابان مانا-مانا ماهكما بيركينان دينغان بينيتان أبا-أبا فيليم، باهان بوبليسيتي فيليم، بوكو، دوكومين أتاو بيندا لين يانغ ديسيتا بادا مينجالانكان أتاو بيروبا سيباغاي بينجالانان مانا-مانا كواسا يانغ ديبيريان دي بواه أكتا إيني، بيرهاك ميندابات بروسدينغ إيتو أتاو أبا-أبا غانتيروجي أتاو ريليف لين ميلينكان جيكا بينيتان إيتو ديبوات تانبا سيباب يانغ موناسباه. القانون رقم 620 قانون مراقبة الأفلام لعام 2002 إدراج جميع التعديلات حتى 1 كانون الثاني / يناير 2006 لا يمكن استرداد أي تكاليف أو أضرار ناجمة عن الاستيلاء 42- لا يجوز لأي شخص، في أية إجراءات أمام أي محكمة فيما يتعلق بمصادرة أي فيلم أو مواد دعائية، أو أي شيء آخر تم الاستيلاء عليه في الممارسة أو الممارسة المزعومة لأي صلاحيات منصوص عليها بموجب هذا القانون، الحق في تحمل تكاليف هذه الإجراءات أو أي تعويضات أو أي تعويض آخر ما لم تتم هذه المصادرة دون سبب معقول. (3) تخضع القوة لهذا القانون في ماليزيا وفي جميع أنحاءها (بما في ذلك مياهها الإقليمية) من أجل صون القانون والنظام، وصون السلام والأمن في ماليزيا، ومنع الجريمة واكتشافها، والتوقيف ومحاكمة الجناة وجمع المعلومات الأمنية. عدم المسؤولية عن الفعل المنفذ بموجب أمر التوقيف 32 (1) إذا كان الدفاع عن أي دعوى ضد ضابط شرطة، أو ضابط شرطة إضافي أو ضابط شرطة احتياطي متطوع أو ضابط شرطة مساعد هو أن الفعل المشتكى منه قد تم في الطعن في أمر صادر عن أي سلطة مختصة، تقوم المحكمة، عند إصدار أمر التوقيف الذي يتضمن توقيع هذه السلطة، وبإثبات أن الفعل المشتكى منه قد نفذ في طاعة هذا الأمر، أن يصدر حكم لصالح ذلك ضابط شرطة، ضابط شرطة إضافي، ضابط شرطة احتياطي متطوع أو ضابط شرطة مساعد. (2) لا يشترط وجود دليل على توقيع هذه السلطة ما لم تكن لدى المحكمة أسباب للشك في صدقها، وحيثما ثبت أن هذا التوقيع غير حقيقي، ينبغي مع ذلك الحكم لصالح ضابط الشرطة أو الشرطة الإضافية إذا ثبت أنه في الوقت الذي ارتكب فيه الفعل المشتكى، كان يعتقد على أساس معقول أن هذا التوقيع حقيقي. تقرير المعلومات الأول نظرية النظرية لا شيء مقابل غياب جميع الولايات القضائية 8211 منطق الوجود والغياب واللامعان 8211 الميتافيزيقا في الوجود والغياب واللاوافق 8211 نظرية نظرية الوجود والغياب واللامتناع التي تحكم الخبيثة (القانون رقم 91) قانون المحاكم الثانوية لعام 1948 (القانون رقم 92) أمب المحاكم الثانوية قانون القواعد لعام 1955 (القانون رقم 55) الاختصاص القضائي (أكت) قانون الاختصاص القضائي من محاكم الشريعة الخرق وسوء تصرف قضاة الصلح الإخلال وسوء السلوك من واجبات الادعاء الإخلال وسوء سلوك ضباط التحقيق واجبات الخرق وسوء سلوك الخبراء الواجبات / نقص / عدم وجود القوانين والأدلة العلمية: الأدلة العلمية 8211 الشهادات العلمية أدلة الخبراء المنطق من الاكتشافات العلمية الميتافيزيقا العلمية ف إنومينا نظرية المعرفة من الملاحظات العلمية (الملاحظات التجريبية / المنهجية العلمية) غزو الأضرار الخصوصية في الادعاء الخبيثة كوتا بهارو. منتيري بيزار توان جورو داتوك نيك أبدول عزيز نيك مات بركاتا تيدابات أنغوتا ماسياراكات تيربيسونا دنغان بيرمينان بارات منيبابكان تيربنغاروه دنجان داكوان أغاما لين، بوليتيك لين. باهكان إسلام ديانغاب مامبو منغوال مانوسيا دلام أسبيك إيبادات دان أوروسان كيلورغا ساجا سيدانغكان كيراجان إسلام ليبيه مستهاك ديتيغاكان دي موكا دنيا. دنيا إني بوكان عربي يانغ بوت، بوكان ميلايو يانغ بوت، تيتابي ديسيبتاكان الله سوت. نامون أوله كيرانا كيتا لينا دينغان permainan8217 إنجيريس، بيرانتشيس، إيتالي دان سيباغينيا، ماكا أدا راكيت بياسا أتاو غولونغان تيربيلاجار، بهكان دي كالانغان توك غورو سينديري تيراسا بهاوا داكوان أغاما سوكو، بوليتيكو سوكو إيتو بيتول، كاتانيا. مالاهان مينغانغاب أغاما هانيا ونتوك منغاغا مانوسيا دلام أسبيك إيبادات دان أوروسان كيكيلورغان ساجا. بيلياو يانغ جوغا مورسيدول آم باس بركاتا ديميكيان سيماسا مينامبايكان خوتباه هاري راية إيدلفيري دي ماسجيد بولاو ميلاكا ديكات سيني، سيمالام. سيسونغوهنيا دلام بيركارا أوروسان أغاما دان بوليتيك ميستيلا سيلاري. 8216Itulah بيربيزان دي أنتارا هيدوب 8216beragama دنغان هيدوب 8216berdemokrasi يانغ تيداك ديسبوت إروباه، كاتانيا. بيلياو بيركاتا، كالاو كومونيس أدا كيراجان، ديموكراسي أدا كيراجان، ماكا كينابا إسلام تيداك بوله أدا كيراجان، سيلاراس دنجان بومي دان مانوسيا سيرتا سيغالا بيندا دي دنيا إيني ديجاديكان الله. جوستيرو، كاتا نيك عزيز، كيراجان إسلام ليبيه مستهاك ديديريكان دي موكا دنيا إيني. باهكان دلام بيركارا أغاما، سانغات بينتينغ باجي مانوسيا منغيكوتي جالان نبي-نبي تيرماسوك دلام أورسان رومان تانغا، بيبيرانغان دان لين-لين. بيلياو مينمباه تيردابات مانوسيا يانغ سيبوك دنغان كيبانغسان دان ميلايو. جوستيرو سيكارا سينيس بيلياو ميمينتا غولونغان إيتو سوبايا مينكاري نبي ميلايو. إيني كيرانا نبي محمد بوكان أورانغ ميلايو تيتابي أورانغ أراب. 8220 (أوله إيتو) كاريلا نبي ميلايو، جنغان كاري نبي أراب. منغولاس سامبوتان هاري رايا إيدلفيتري 1433 هجري، بيلياو مينكادانغكان ونتوك تاهون هادابان، كاد أوكابان سيلمات هاري راية ديتمباه دنيا أخيرات بادا رانغكيان أوكابان سيلمات هاري راية، معاف ظاهر باتين. إني بينتينغ باجي ميمبولهكان سيموا كاوم منغينغاتي أبا إيتو أخيرات. ميلايو باكا تيرينغاتكان أخيرات، سينا ​​باكا تيرينغاتكان أخيرات. أورانغ بوتيه باكا، تيرينغاتكان أخيرات. إيني ميمبولهكان كيتا بيرداكواه أبابيلا ميريكا بيرتانيا أبا إيتو أخيرات، أوجارنيا. توان غورو مينمباه، سيليباس مانوسيا ماتي ديهيدوبكان سيمولا، ميريكا أكان ديتانيا ديبيري آل-كوران سما أدا ميمباسانيا أتاو تيداك، ديبيري تيلينغا سما أدا مندنغار ناسيهات آل-كوران أتاو تيداك. ديميكيان جوغا ديبيري كاكي سما أدا ديغوناكان بيرجي كي ماسجيد، ديبيريكان تانغان سما أدا منغوناكان ونتوغ منغوندي كي أراه ميندولاتكان إسلام أتاو منجاهانمكان مانوسيا. 20 ديسمبر تقويم أمريكا الوسطى العد الطويل، ولا سيما المستخدمة من قبل الحضارة المايا ما قبل كولومبوس وغيرها، يكمل 8220 دورة كبيرة 8221 من ثلاثة عشر b8217ak8217tuns (فترات من 144،000 يوما لكل منهما) منذ تاريخ إنشاء الأسطورية من العصر الحالي 8217s الحالي. 24 25 أنا لن أعرض البراهين الرياضية في هذه المدونة ولكن أفترض أن التوضيح أدناه سيكون كافيا لرسم ما يجري في ماليزيا (لا تشمل نظرية لينشستر غير الخطية ونظرية لعبة N-بيرسونس): وقد وصلت نظرية 8220R-أهما-N8221 (6 الأبجدية الأبعاد) إلى نهايتها نحو وجهتها من الدورة ال 13 للانتخابات العامة (برو-13). وسيكون رئيس الوزراء القادم رئيس الوزراء السابع الذي ينتخب من قبل سلطة الشعب. فيبوناتشي هنا لشرح أن هذا العام الماليزية القادمة الانتخابات، و برو-13 هو لإنجاز الدورة ال 13 عن طريق اختيار رئيس الوزراء السابع. الفوضى أمر ولكن من دون دورية. المعادلات الكنسي 8211 الذاتي بيرتوربيد رئيس الوزراء أرقام 8211 الفوضى والاضطرابات 8211 هذا سيكون الفوضى الحقيقية في التسامي من الاضطرابات غير متناح. دوامة أرخميدس دوامة فيبوناتشي هذا هو نهاية فيبوناتشي ريتراسيمنت في ماليزيا، و هورست الأس هو أقل من 0.5 و فركتال البعد مؤشر هو فوق 1.5 8211 نحن الآن في منطقة المشي عشوائي أو براوني موشن 8211 نهاية تشيميرا تيرانيكال 8220Superpower8221 أن هزم من قبل بيليروفون مع مساعدة من بيغاسوس 8211 اكتمال المعادلة الكنسي مع المعلمات ودرجة الحرية في التوازن. أما الكيميرا (تشيميرا أو تشيمرا) (/ كمر / أور / كامر / غريك:، خيمايرا، من خيماروس 8220she-goat8221) فقد كان، وفقا للأساطير اليونانية، مخلوقا وحشيا ينفث النار من ليسيا في آسيا الصغرى، 8230 بيرسيه 3.0: بيكاس بنداكوا كيني بيغوام أنور كوالا لومبور: بيكاس كيتوا بينداكوارايا باجي كيس ليوات إي، داتوك موهد يوسف زينال أبيدين (غامبار) كيني مينيرتاي باسوكان بيغوامبيلا داتوك سيري أنور إبراهيم دلام كيس بيرسيه 3.0. تينداكان إيني ميروباكان ساتو تامباران هبة كيبادا بيردانا منتيري، منتيري دلام نيجري دان بيغوام نيغارا كيرانا أورانغ تربايك ميريكا سيلاما إيني منيرتاي باسوكان بيمبانغكانغ. أنور بيرساما دنغان تيمبالان بريسيدن يير، أزمين علي دان بيكاس أهلي مجلس بيمبينان بوسات، بدرول هشام شاهارين ديهادابكان كي مكه سيسين كوالا لمبور أتاس تودوهان منغامبيل بهاجيان دلام بروتس جالانان، دي بواه أكتا بيرهيمبونان أمان. اسم، الطاغية الجمع. يرجى إلقاء نظرة على تاريخ 9 أبريل و 10 و 11 من عام 2012 (ذات الصلة زلزال شمال سومطرة)، والأشكال الزرقاء هي دورات متناسقة من نسبة فيبوناتشي (النسبة الذهبية) 8211 الفوضى والدولة واليوتوبيا (كتاب كتبه روبرت نورزيك ) لقد تلقيت العديد من الأسئلة من قرائي حول الكون، وأود أن أبلغ أن إنتروبي ليست هي نفسها تشاوس التي كنا قد ناقشنا هنا. وقت التحديث الخميس أبر 12 9:42:56 أوتك 2012 نحن نعد بدلاتنا المدنية: المرحلة الثانية 8211 تعيين محامون بارزين لبدء الدعوى 8211 نولد المال من الفوضى والاضطرابات 8211 فيبوناتشي نظرية العدد، نظرية الفوضى، مساحة كسورية، كسورية الوقت، سلسلة كسورية زمنية، تحليل كسوري الأبعاد، تحليل كسورية للسوق، مقدمة في ضبابية العصبية غامض في ديناميات غير الخطية من أنظمة الفوضى (مساحات المرحلة) 8211 من سقراط وأفلاطون وأرسطو وابنو هيثم وابنو سينا، فارابي، الخوارزمي إلى ديفيد هيوم، جون لوك، إيمانويل كانت، برتراند راسل، والسير كارل بوبر 8211 سر، أن الله يخفي سرية له داخل ضخمة (ضخمة جدا) كتل من أرقام رئيس الوزراء (في جميع أنحاء الكون)، والتي ، 8220Encrypted8221 كل مجموعة واحدة من مجموعات المعلومات التي تم الحصول عليها مجرد شيء عن حقيقة الكون لدينا 8211 كريتيو السابق نيهيلو 8211 مجموعة فارغة (مجموعة فارغة / /) 8211 نظرية مجموعة فارغة (نظريتي: هو) فوريكس 2012: نظرة على الأرباح (نحن قه جمال المال من الفوضى والاضطراب) جمال أرقام فيبوناتشي (النسبة الذهبية) في الأسواق الكسورية والتشابه الذاتي التحليلات السلوكية (فرضية الأسواق الفعالة والمضاربة المالية) جون D. راولز 8216 العدل كما الإنصاف 8217، الاستعراض الفلسفي، 1958 جون D. راولز، A ثوري أوف جاستيس (كامبريدج، ما: هارفارد ونيفرزيتي بريس، 1971) ديفيد هيوم، إنكيرز أون ذي هيومان وندرستاندينغ أند أون ذي برينسيبلز أوف مورالس. حرره L. E. سيلبي-بيج (أوكسفورد: كلارندرون بريس، 1962) أرسطو، الميتافيزيقيا. ترجمة مع مقدمة من قبل هو لوسون تانكرد. (بينغين كلاسيكس، 1998) بوست نافيغاتيون محمد إزهام محمد ياتيم المعرفة هي حرة للجميع كل شيء هنا هو مجانا. لا يوجد أي تهمة ل أويسومينيس أو جاذبية - التنين المحارب - الكونغ فو باندا 1 البحوث صناديق الرعاية طلب من القراء الذين يرغبون في رعاية لزيادة أبحاثي، انكم مدعوون. يرجى إرسالها إلى رعاية صناديق البحوث في حسابي باي بال: دوناتكاسيمبابا - شكرا لجهات مانحي التي أرسلت على الأقل 1USD كل لزيادة صندوق البحوث بلدي. المحمول: (006) -019-2787830 إم: كوديجينيوشموتم بناء على طلبات من قرائي، وأود أن عرض رقم هاتفي النقال ورقم إم. زيارة موقعنا على الانترنت anticyberforensics. wordpress (نحن توليد المال من الفوضى والاضطراب) الأدلة العلمية والقانون وغالبا ما توصف التناقضات بين القانون والعلوم في المصطلحات الثنائية: العلم يسعى الحقيقة، والقانون العدالة العدل هو وصفي، ولكن القانون هو العلم الوصفي يؤكد على التقدم، في حين يؤكد القانون على العملية. المقارنات بين العلم والقانون غالبا ما تحتفل العلوم الالتزام الفريد للاختبار المنهجي للملاحظات واستعدادها لتقديم استنتاجاتها إلى الحرجة التحقيق والتزوير. ومن هنا، فإن الفكر والسبب والحكم كاستنتاجات وأحكام من الكليات المعرفية التي تنص القوانين على وصفها مسبقا والعلم يوصف بأنه الإدراك العلمي مسبقا ضمن الحقيقة اللاحقة. (محمد إزهام محمد ياتيم، البيانات الوصفية الرقمية، الطابع الزمني ونظرية النسبية - كلية الرياضيات، جامعة كامبريدج، 15 شارع جي تومسون، كامبريدج CB3 9EW المملكة المتحدة، نشر نوفمبر 2010) ويسنشافتليشر بيويس أوند جيسيتز داي كونتراست زويششن جيسيتز أوند ويسنشافت ويردن هوفيغ إن دن بنرن بيزيتشنونغن بيسكريبن: ويسنشافت سوشت وهرهيت، داس جيزيتز توت جيركتيكيت ويسنشافت إست بيشكريبند، يبر جيسيتز إست فورسكريبند ويسنشافت هيبت فورتسكريت هيرفور، وريند إيه جيسيتز هيرفورهبت بروز. فيرغليتش زويششن ويسنشافت أوند ديم جيسيتز فيرن هوفيغ إينزيغارتيج فيربليشتونغ دير ويسنشافت زور سيستيماتيششن برفونغ فون بيوباشتونجين أوند سين بيريتويليكيت، سين زوسامنفاسونجن بيم كريتشن برفين أوند بي دير فلششونغ إينزوريشن. فولغليش ويرد دير إنتيلكت، دير غروند أوند داس أورتيل ألس زوسامنفاسونجن أوند أورتيلزبرش دير كوغنيتيفن لهركربر، فون دينن جيسيتزن إينم بريوري أوند إين ويسنشافت فورجكريبن ويردن، ألس داس ويسنشافتليش إركينن إين بريوري إنتيرهالب a بوستيريوري دير وهرهيت بيسكريبن. (محمد إزهام محمد ياتيم، ميتاداتا ديجيتال ميتاتا، زيتستمبل أوند داي ثوري ريلاتيفيت - دير ونيفرزيت فون كامبريدج، 15 جي تومسون فون ألي، كامبريدج CB3 9EW فيرينيغتس كنيغريتش، نوفيمبر 2010) فيدنس إت لوا سسينتيفيكس ليس كونتراستيس إنتر لا لوا إت لا سسينس سونت سوفنت دكريتس إن تيرمز بينيرس. لا سسينس تشيرتش لا فريت، لا لوا فيت لا جاستيس لا سسينس إست واصفي، ميس لا لوا إست برينكريبتيف لا سسينس سوليغن لي بروغرز، تانديس كيو لا لوا سوليني ديس كومبارايسونس دي بروسيسوس إنتر لا سسينس إت لا لوا كلبرر سوفنت لينغاجيمنت ونيك دي لا سسينس ليساي سيستماتيك ديس أوبسيرفاتيونس إت سا بون فولونت دي سومتر سيس ستوديز أو سونديج إت لا فالسيفيكاتيون كريتيكس. وباختصار، فإن العقل الوراثي، والعقل السائد، والسباكة، والقضاء على الاستنتاجات، والقضاء على حقوق الإنسان، والمبادئ التوجيهية، والمبادئ التوجيهية، والمبادئ التوجيهية، والمبادئ التوجيهية، والمبادئ التوجيهية. (محمد إزهام محمد ياتيم، البيانات الوصفية الرقمية، هوروداتور إت لا ثوري دونيفرزيت دي ريلاتيفيت - دي كامبريدج، أفينو دي 15 جي تومسون، كامبريدج CB3 9EW رويوم-يوني، ديت نوفمبر 2010) إيفيدنسيا e لي سينتفيكاس أوس كونتراكتيس إنتر a لي سينسيا دي ديسكريتوس ريتيرديمنت إم تيرموس بينريوس: a سينسيا بروكورا a فيرديد، a لي فاز a جوستيا a سينسيا ديسكريتيفا، ماس a لي بريسكريبتيف a سينسيا إمفاتيزا o بروجريسو، فيستو كيو a لي إمفاتيزا كومبارايس دو بروتوسو إنتر a سينسيا إي لي كوميمورار فريكونتيمنت o كومبنسيسو أورجنال دا سينسيا و سيستارتيكو داس أوبسيرفيسيس يو سيو فولونتاريديد سوبيتر سواس يحد من سوندار إي تزييف كرتيكوس. داكوي، o إنتلكت، a رازو e o جولغامنتو كومو كونكلوس e e فيرديكتس داس فاكولدادس كونيتيف بور كيو أس ليس بريسكريتاس a بريفيلي e سينسيا ديسكريتوس كومو a كونيو سينتفيكا a بريفيري دنترو a بريستوريوري دا فيرديد. (محمد إزهام محمد ياتيم، البيانات الوصفية الرقمية، الطابع الزمني إي تيوريا دا ونيفرزيديد دو ريلاتيفيتي - دي كامبريدج، أفينيدا دي 15 جي تومسون، كامبريدج CB3 9EW رينو أونيدو، نوفيمبر 2010) بروفا e ليج سسينتيفيتش I كونتراستي فر ليج e لا سسينزا سونو ديسكريتي سبيسو نيي تيرميني بيناري: لا سسينزا سيركا لا فيريت، لا ليج فا لا جيوستيزيا لا سسينزا ديسكريتيفا، ما لا ليج نورماتيفا لا سسينزا d ريسالتو آل بروجريسو، منتر لا ليج d ريسالتو أي كونفورتي دي دي بروسسو فرا لا لا سسينزا e لا ليج سيليبرار سبيسو ليمبيغنو أونيكو ديلا سسينزا ألا بروفا سيستيماتيكا ديل أوزيرفازيوني e لا ريلاتيفا كومبياسنزا بريسنتار لي ريلاتيون كونتراكتيوني آل سونداغجيو ألا ألا فالسيفيكازيون كريتيسي. كيندي، إيل إنتلكت، إيل موتيفو إد إل جيوديزيو كومي كونتراكتيون e فيرديتي ديل فاكولت كونوسيتيف دا كوي لي ليجي سي بريسكريفونو بريوري e لا سسينزا ديسكريتو كومي تو لا كوغنيزيون سسينتيفيكا a بريوري ألينترنو a بوستيريوري ديلا فيريت. (محمد إزهام محمد ياتيم، ديجيتال ميتاداتا، تيمستامب e لا توريا ديلونيفرزيت دي ريلاتيفيت - دي كامبريدج، أون فيل دي 15 جي تومسون، كامبريدج CB3 9EW ريجنو ونيتو، بوبليكاتو نوفمبر 2010):،،،. . ،، قبل ذلك مسبقا مسبقا. (محمد إزهام محمد ياتيم، ميتاداتا، تيمستامب - كامبريدج، 15 جي تومسون، كامبريدج CB3 9EW، نوف 2010) إيفيدنسيا y لي سينتفيكاس لوس كونتراكتيس إنتر لا لي y لا سينسيا سي دسكريبن a مينودو إن ترمينوس بيناريوس: لا سينسيا بوسكا فيرداد، لا لي هيس لا جوستيسيا لا سينسيا إس دسكريبتيفا، بيرو لا لي إس بريسبتيفا لا سينسيا أسنتا بروغريسو، مينتراس كيو تل لي أسنتا بروسيسو لوس أومباريسونس دي C إنتر لا سينسيا y لا لي سيليبران a مينودو لا كوميسين نيكا دي لا سينسيا a لا برويبا سيستيمتيكا دي أوبسيرفاسيونيس y سو بينا فولونتاد دي سوميتر سوز كونسيستنس a سوندار يا لا فالسيفيكاسين كرتيكوس. بور لو تانتو، لا إنتيلكتو، لا رازن y إل جويسيو كومو كونستيتوريس y لوس فيريديكتوس دي لاس فاكولتادس كوغنوسيتيفاس بور كوينس لوس ليس سون بريسكريتوس a بريوري y لا سينسيا سي ديسكوس كومو لا كوغنيسين سينتفيكا a بريوري دنترو a بوستيريوري دي لا فيرداد. (محمد إزهام محمد ياتيم، ديجيتال ميتاداتا، تيمستامب y لا تيورا دي لا ونيفرزيداد دي لا ريلاتيفيداد - دي كامبريدج، أفينيدا دي 15 جي تومسون، كامبريدج CB3 9EW رينو أونيدو، نوفيمبر دي 2010) بروفا e ليج سسينتيفيتش I كونتراستي فر ليج e لا سسينزا سونو ديسكريتي سبيسو نيي تيرميني بيناري: لا سسينزا سيركا لا فيريت، لا ليج فا لا جيوستيزيا لا سسينزا ديسكريتيفا، ما لا ليج نورماتيفا لا سسينزا d ريسالتو آل بروجرتو، منتر لا ليج d ريسالتو أي كونفورتي دي بروسو فرا لا لا سسينزا e لا ليج سيليبرار سبيسو ليمبيغنو أونيكو ديلا سسينزا ألا بروفا سيستيماتيكا ديل أوزيرفازيوني e لا ريلاتيفا كومبياسنزا بريسنتار لي ريلاتيون كونتراكتيوني آل سونداغجيو إد ألا فالسيفيكازيون كريتيسي. كيندي، إيل إنتلكت، إيل موتيفو إد إيل جيوديزيو كومي كونتراكتيون e فيرديتي ديل فاكولت كونوسيتيف دا كوي لي ليجي سي بريسكريفونو بريوري e لا سسينزا ديسكريتو كومي تو لا كوغنيزيون سسينتيفيكا a بريوري ألينترنو a بوستيريوري ديلا فيريت. (محمد إزهام محمد ياتيم، البيانات الوصفية الرقمية، الطابع الزمني لا توريا ديلونيفرزيت دي ريلاتيفيت - دي كامبريدج، أون فيل دي 15 جي تومسون، كامبريدج CB3 9EW ريجنو ونيتو، نوفمبر 2010): t. (محمد إزهام محمد ياتيم ميتاداتا 15 جي تومسون CB3 9EW 2010 11 -):،،،. (محمد إزهام محمد ياتيم، ميتاداتا، 15 جي تومسون، CB3 9EW -، 2010 11) ويلارد فان أورمان كوين إنديسرنيبيليتي أوف إيدنتيالز - مبدأ منطقي ينص على أنه إذا كان A و B متطابقين، فإن كل عقار ينتمي إلى واحد منهم ينتمي إلى الآخر. العنصر الأساسي وطرق الهجوم / دورة الدفاع في التحقيقات الجنائية الإلكترونية (التي يجب على الادعاء / الدفاع أن ينشئها ويثبتها أمام المحكمة): الحيازة والمحتويات والشبكات الحيازة: المراقبة والحفظ والمعرفة محتويات الأدلة الإلكترونية: الإفصاح والاكتشاف والمقبولية الربط الشبكي : الشبكة المحلية (لان)، شبكة المنطقة الواسعة (وان)، الإنترنت و برودباندز، الأقمار الصناعية والاتصالات اللاسلكية وغيرها. فئات مكافحة سايبر الطب الشرعي إكسيون هو موضوع المهنية مصممة مع المدارس، والمنظمات غير الربحية، والمنظمات في الاعتبار. بنقرة واحدة، يمكنك ترجمة محتوى موقعك إلى 100 لغة. وستعقد الدورة الثانية الأمريكية وردكامب في فيلادلفيا، با، في 2-4 ديسمبر. الحصول على تذكرتك الآن الملايين من الجديدة، من السهل أن نتذكر. blog المجالات متاحة لبلوق الخاص بك، للمرة الأولى على الإطلاق. مات سويني، مدون ومصمم على شبكة الإنترنت والتسويق في ولاية ويسكونسن، يبني عملائه039 المواقع على وورد. لفترة محدودة you039ll لديك الفرصة للمطالبة. blog اسم قبل الجميع. رؤساء السيارات إلى هيوستن، تكساس جنبا إلى جنب مع 15،000 شخص آخرين للتحدث النساء في التكنولوجيا. الإصدار الأحدث من دائرة الرقابة الداخلية لأجهزة إفون و إيباد يتضمن القدرة على إرسال ملصقات لأصدقائك مع تطبيقات الكتروني والآن يمكنك مشاركة حبك من وورد معهم، وورد أيضا العالم هو التطبيق ملصق الكتروني مجانا لدائرة الرقابة الداخلية 10، ويشمل جلبت جوجل المفضلة لديك العاطفية صفحات أمب بسرعة فائقة إلى نتائج البحث - وسيكون للمستخدمين وردبريس جاهزا. تشجيع الزوار على موقعك لجعل أصواتهم مسموعة مع أداة تسجيل الناخبين هيلوفوت الجديدة. نشر في دراسات حالة القانون ريبكو هولدينغز بهد v المدعي العام المحكمة العليا (كوالالمبور) غوبال سري رام جسا مراجعة جنائية لا W-43-7 لعام 1997 الدستور الدستوري التعدي على ما إذا كانت المادة 126 (2) من قانون صناعة الأوراق المالية لعام 1983 و ق 39 (2) من قانون هيئة الأوراق المالية لعام 1993 كانت فرائض جدا المادة 145 (3) من الدستور الاتحادي وكانت باطلة إلى هذا الحد القانون الدستوري التشريعي التعدي على الدستور عقيدة الاستباق المحتمل سلطة المحكمة لتطبيق المذهب الإجراءات الجنائية حق النيابة في إجراء الملاحقة القضائية ما إذا كانت أية سلطة أخرى بخلاف المدعي العام قد تكون مخولة قانونيا لإجراء المقاضاة الدستور الاتحادي المادة 145 (3) قانون صناعة الأوراق المالية لعام 1983 ق 126 (2) قانون هيئة الأوراق المالية 1993 ق 39 (2) الأوراق المالية سلوك الادعاء بموجب قانون صناعة الأوراق المالية 1983 سواء أي س (3) قانون صناعة الأوراق المالية لعام 1983 ق 126 (2) قانون هيئة الأوراق المالية 1993 ق 39 (2) كان مقدم الطلب، ريبكو القابضة بهد (8216RepcO8217)، هو (8216th عمولة 8217) هيئة أنشأها قانون هيئة الأوراق المالية 1993 (8216th SCA8217) لانتهاك المادة 86 من قانون صناعة الأوراق المالية 1983 (8216th SIA8217). وفي جلسة الاستماع، اعترض محامي جمهورية الكونغو الديمقراطية على اعتراض أولي على موقف ضباط اللجنة الذين يبدو أنهم يحاكمون القضية. وقد أجرى الضابطان الادعاء وفقا للعملية المشتركة للقرار 126 (2) من قانون التحقيق الجنائي والمادة 39 (2) من اتفاقية سكا التي تسمح، في جملة أمور، بمقاضاة أي جريمة بموجب القوانين يقوم بها المسجل من الشركات أو من قبل أي ضابط مفوض من قبل المسجل أو رئيس اللجنة أو اللجنة. وقد قيل إن المادة 126 (2) من القانون الجنائي الدولي والمادة 39 (2) من قانون الإجراءات الجزائية هي المادة 145 (3) من الدستور الاتحادي، وهي باطلة إلى هذا الحد. وعمل قاضي الجلسات، في مواجهة الحجة الدستورية، بموجب المادة 30 من قانون المحاكم القضائية لعام 1964 وأحال السجل في القضية إلى المحكمة العليا لتحديد دستورية القسمين الفرعيين. (2) من قانون الضمان الاجتماعي و 39 (2) من قانون الإجراءات الجزائية غير دستوري، لاغية وباطلة: السلطة الوحيدة التي يحق لها دستوريا إجراء الملاحقات القضائية هي النائب العام كمدع عام. وقد وضعت هذه السيارة الصفة الواردة في المادة 376 والأقسام اللاحقة من قانون الإجراءات الجنائية (فمس كاب 6) (8216the CPC8217) هذا الشك (انظر ص 688 ب) ب داتوك هارون بن هج إدريس أمب أورس 1976 2 ملج 116 و ب v ليم شوي وانغ أمبير أورس 1979 1 ملج 65 يتبع. 1997 3 ملج 681 أت 682 استنادا إلى السلطات، فإن التعبير 8216conduct8217 الذي يظهر في المادة 145 (3) وفي القسمين المطعون فيه يحملان نفس المعنى. وبما أن الدستور يأذن حصريا للمدعي العام بإجراء الملاحقات القضائية، يجب أن يتبع ذلك أنه لا يجوز لأي سلطة أخرى أن تمارس سلطة قانونية للقيام بهذه المهمة. ومن ثم، فإن المادة 126 (2) من قانون الضمان الاجتماعي التي تسمح بإجراء المقاضاة من قبل مسجل الشركات أو من قبل أي ضابط مفوض من قبل رئيس قلم المحكمة أو رئيس اللجنة هو المادة 145 (3) من القانون الاتحادي. ومع ذلك، إذا كان مسجل الشركات نائبا عاما للمدعي العام، وبهذه الصفة يقوم بمقاضاة مرتكبي جريمة بموجب قانون الاستثامر التكميلي، وهو ما لن يتم القبض عليه بموجب المادة 145 (3) من الدستور. ومن ناحية أخرى، لا يتم وضع رئيس اللجنة على قدم المساواة، وبالتالي لا يؤذن دستوريا بالتصريح أو إجراء الملاحقات القضائية في إطار وكالة الاستخبارات المركزية. وعلاوة على ذلك، على الرغم من أن أعضاء اللجنة وخدمتها يعتبرون موظفين عموميين، لأغراض أداء واجباتهم، فإنهم لا يدخلون في نطاق المادة 380 (ط) من قانون الإجراءات الجنائية لتمكينهم من إجراء الملاحقة القضائية (انظر الفقرة 690CG) طويل بن سمات أمب أورس v ب 1974 2 ملج 152 وجونسون تان هان سنغ ضد ب 1977 2 ملج 66 يتبع. وبنفس الطريقة، تتعارض المادة 39 (2) من اتفاقية سكا مع المادة 145 (3). وبسبب المادة 4 (1) من الدستور الاتحادي، كونه قانونا يتنافى مع الدستور، فإن الباب الفرعي يفسح المجال وبالتالي فهو باطل وغير دستوري (انظر ص 691 باء). وسيكون من الظلم الواضح أن يصدر حكم رجعي بشأن بطلان الجزئين الفرعيين المطعون فيهما. وبالتالي فإن الإعلان عن البطلان يجب أن يكون مستقبلا فقط، وأن يشمل فقط القضية والحالات المسجلة من تاريخ الحكم (انظر ص 692 أ) ب ب داتو ياب بنغ 1987 2 ملج 311 ومامات بن داود أمب أورس v الحكومة من ماليزيا 1988 1 ملج 119 تليها. ملخص باهاسا ماليزيا بيموهون، ريبكو القابضة دينار بحريني (8216RepcO8217)، تيلاه ديبرتودوكان أوليه سوروهنجايا سيكوريتي (8216suruhanjaya tersebut8217) سيبواه بادان يانغ ديتوبوهكان أوليه أكتا سوروهانجايا سيكوريتي 1993 (8216ASS8217) كيرانا ميلنغجار 86Akta بيريندستريان سيكوريتي 1983 (8216APS8217). دي بيمبيكاران، بيغوام ريبكو ميمبوت بانتاهان بيرمولان أتاس لوكوس ستاندي دوا أورانغ بيغواي سوروهانجايا تيرسيبوت يانغ هادير ونتوك منداك كيس. بيهاك بينداكوا ديكينداليكان أوله دوا أورانغ بيغاواي تيرسيبوت مينوروت أوبيراسي بيرساما s 126 (2) أس دان y 39 (2) أبس يانغ، أنتارا لين، ميمبيناركان بينداكوان مانا-مانا كيسلاهان دي بواه أكتا-أكتا تيرسيبوت أونتوك ديجالانكان أوله بندافتار سياريكات أتاو أوله mana - مانا بيغاواي يانغ ديبيريكواسا أوله بيندافتار سياريكات أتاو بينجيروسي سوروهانجايا تيرسيبوت أتاو سوروهانجايا تيرسيبوت. أدالا ديهجاهكان بهاوا s 126 (2) أس دان 1997 3 ملج 681 أت 683 s 39 (2) أبس أدالا أولترا فيريس بيركارا 145 (3) بيرلمباغان بيرسيكوتوان دان أدالا تيرباتال سيتاكات إيتو. حكيم سيسيان، يانغ ديهادابي دنغان هوجاه بيرلمباغان، بيرتينداك دي بواه s 30 أكتا مهكا كهاكيمان 1964 دان منغانتار ريكود كيس كي ماهكاما تينغجي باجي ميننتوكان بيرلمباغان دوا سوبسيكسين إيتو. ديبوتسكان، منجيسيتيهاركان كيدوا-دوا s 129 (2) أبس دان s 39 (2) أس تيداك مينوروت بيرلمباغان، تاك ساه دان تيرباتال: ساتو-ساتونيا أوتوريتي يانغ بيرهاك دي سيسي بيرلمباغان وانغ منغنداليكان بينداكوان أدالا بيغوام نيغارا سيباغاي بينداكوا راية. سوسونان بروسيدور يانغ تيرماكتوب دلام s 376 دان سيكسين-سيكسين يانغ بيريكوتنيا دلام كانون أكارا جنيا (نمب باب 6) (8216KAJ8217) ميليتاكان بيركارا إني دي لوار باتاس كيراغوان (لهات مس 688B) ب v داتوك هارون بن هج إدريس أمب أورس 1976 2 ملج 116 دان ب v ليم شوي وانغ أمب أورس 1979 1 ملج 65 ديكوت. بيرداساركان أوتوريتي-أوتوريتي، أونغكابان 8216menjalankan8217 يانغ مينونجول دلام بيركارا 145 (3) دان دلام دوا سوبسكسين يانغ ديبيرزوالكان ميماوا ماكسود يانغ سما. أوليه كيرانا بيرمباغاغان ميموريكواسا كيبادا بيغوام نيغارا سيكارا إكسكلوسيف ونتوك منجالانكان بينداكوان، إيني بيرماكنا باهاوا تيادا بيهاك بيركواسا يانغ لين بوله ميمبونياي كواسا دي سيسي أوندانغ-أوندانغ أون ميلاكزاناكان فونغسي إيتو. ماكا، s 126 (2) أبس يانغ ميمبناركان بينداكوان ديجالانكان أوله بندافتار سياريكات أتاو مانا-مانا بيغواي لين يانغ ديبيريكواسا أوله بيندافتار أتاو بينجيروسي سوروهانجايا تيرسيبوت أدالا أولترا فيريس بيركارا 145 (3) بيرلمباغان بيرسيكوتوان. والاو باغيمانابون، جيكا بيندافتار سياريكات أدالا تيمبالان بنداكوا رايا يانغ ديوارتاكان دان دلام كيوباياان ديميكيان مينجالانكان بينداكوان كي أتاس كيسلاهان دي بواه أبس، إيني تيداك تيربيرانغكاب أوله بيركارا 145 (3) بيرلمباغان. سيباليا، بينجيروسي سوروهانجايا تيرسيبوت تيداك بيرادا دلام كيدودوكان يانغ سما دان دنغان إيتو تيداك ديبيريكواسا مينوروت بيرلمباغان ونتوك ميموريكواسا أتاو ونتوك منجالانكان بينداكوان دي بواه أبس. سيلانجوتنيا، والوبون ونتوك توجوان منجالانكان توغاس، أهلي-أهلي دان بيكرجا-بيكيرجا سوروهانجايا تيرسيبوت ديانغاب سيباغاي بيغاواي أوام، ميريكا تيداك ديرانغكومي أوله سكوب s 380 (i) كاج باجي ميمبيناركان ميريكا مينجالانكان بينداكوان (لهات مس 690CG) طويلة بن سمات أمبير أورس v ب 1974 2 ملج 152 دان جونسون تان هان سنغ ضد ب 1977 2 ملج 66 ديكوت. دلام كارا يانغ سما، s 39 (2) أس بادا كيسيلوروهانيا مينيالاهي بيركارا 145 (3). ديسبابكان بيركارا 4 (1) بيرليمباغان بيرسيكوتوان، يا ميروباكان أوندانغ-أوندانغ يانغ تيداك كونسيستن دنغان بيرلمباغان، سوبسكسين إيتو ميمبرالي لالوان دان دنغان إيتو أدالا تاك ساه دان ميلانغغار بيرمباغان (ليهات مس 691B). أدالا سونغوه تيداك عادل أونتوك ميمبوت كيبوتسان سيكارا كيبيلاكانغان أتاس كيتاكسان دوا سوبسكسين يانغ ديبرسوالكان. 1997 3 ملج 681 أت 684 دنغان إيتو، بيريسيتيهاران أتاس كيتاكساهان هاروسلا منجادي بروسبكتيف سهاجا دان هاروس تيرماسوك هانيا كيس إني دان كيس-كيس يانغ ديدافاركان داري طارق كيبوتوسان (ليهات مس 692AB) ب v داتو ياب بينغ 1987 2 ملج 311 دان ممات بن داود أمب أورس v غوفرنمنت أوف مالايسيا 1988 1 ملج 119 ديكوت. للاطلاع على قضية التعدي على الدستور، انظر 3 مالال 8217s ديجيست (الطبعة الرابعة، 1994 إعادة إصدار) الفقرة 993. وبالنسبة للحالات على الأوراق المالية، انظر 11 الخلاصة Malal8217s (الطبعة الرابعة، 1996 إعادة إصدار) الفقرات 766793. للحصول على قضية بشأن الحق في إجراء الملاحقة ، انظر 5 مالال 8217s ديجيست (4th إد، 1994 ريسو) بارا 2040. القضايا المشار إليها ديوان أوندانغان نيجيري كيلانتان أمب أنور v نوردين بن صالح أمب أنور 1992 1 ملج 697 (ريف) جونسون تان هان سنغ ضد ب 1977 2 ملج 66 (فولد) هونغ ليونغ إكيبمنت سن بهد v ليو فوك تشوان ونداء آخر 1996 1 ملج 481 (ريف) لونغ بن سمات أمب أورس v ب 1974 2 ملج 152 (فولد) مامات بن داود أمب أورس v حكومة ماليزيا 1988 1 ملج 119 (فولد) ب v داتوك هارون بن هج إدريس أمب أورس 1976 2 ملج 116 (فولد) ب v ليم شوي وانغ أمب أورس 1979 1 ملج 65 (فولد) ب v داتو ياب بينغ 1987 2 ملج 311 (فولد) ريموند ضد النائب العام 1982 2 ولر 849 ريف) تان تك سينغ v سوروهنجايا بيرخيدماتان بنديديكان ماليزيا أمب أنور 1996 1 ملج 261 (ريف) تشريعات محالة إلى محاكم القضاء قانون 1964 ق 30 قانون الإجراءات الجنائية (فمس كاب 6) سس 376، 380، 380 '1' الدستور الاتحادي المواد 4 (1) و 145 (3) قانون هيئة الأوراق المالية 1993 ق 39 (2) قانون صناعة الأوراق المالية 1983 سس 86، 91 ، 126 (2) محمد شفي عبد الله (نغ أيك غوان معه) لمقدم الطلب. وأزهر محمد، وسامسول سليمان (نواب المدعي العام) للمدعى عليه. غوبال سري رام جسا (تقديم الحكم الشفوي): هذا هو الطلب بموجب المادة 30 (1) من قانون المحاكم القضائية 1964. ينص هذا القسم على ما يلي: 30 (1) في أي دعوى في أي محكمة تابعة، to the effect of any provision of the Constitution the presiding officer of the court may stay the proceedings and may transmit the record thereof to the High Court. 1997 3 MLJ 681 at 685 (2) Any record of proceedings transmitted to the High Court under this section shall be examined by a Judge of the Court and where the Judge considers that the decision of a question as to the effect of a provision of the Constitution is necessary for the determination of the proceedings he shall deal with the case in accordance with section 48 as if it were a case before him in the original jurisdiction of the High Court in which the question had arisen. (3) Subsections (1) and (2) shall be deemed to be rules of court for the purposes of Article 128(2) of the Constitution. The matter arose in the following way. The applicant, Repco Holdings Bhd (8216RepcO8217) is a public limited company. Its shares are freely traded in the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange. On 27 January 1996, Repco issued a statement to the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange. The statement contained certain facts which the Securities Commission considered to contravene s 86 of the Securities Industry Act 1983 (8216the SIA8217). So it took steps to institute proceedings against Repco. On 21 October 1996, it applied for and obtained a summons from the Sessions Court in Kuala Lumpur against Repco. The charge annexed to the summons refers to the Repco8217s statement I spoke of a moment ago and alleges an infringement of s 86 of the SIA and punishable under s 91 thereof. The summons was returnable on 29 November 1996. Repco appeared before the sessions court on that day. The sessions court then fixed the case for hearing on 25 August 1997. On that date, counsel who appeared for Repco took a preliminary objection to the locus standi of the two officers who appeared to prosecute the case. These two officers were Ms Foo Lee Mei and Ms Seow Siew Mei. They were officers of the Securities Commission, a body created by the Securities Commission Act 1993 (8216the SCA8217). The prosecution of the case against Repco was in the hands of these two officers pursuant to the joint operation of s 126(2) of the SIA and s 39(2) of the SCA. For completeness, I will reproduce both these sections in full. They read as follows. Section 126(2) of the SIA: 126 (1) No prosecution for any offence under this Act shall be instituted except with the consent in writing of the Public Prosecutor. (2) A prosecution for any offence against any provision of this Act may be conducted by the Registrar or by any officer authorized in writing by the Registrar or by any officer authorized in writing by the Chairman of the Commission. Section 39(2) of the SCA: 39 (1) No prosecution for any offence under this Act shall be instituted except with the consent in writing of the Public Prosecutor. (2) Any officer of the Commission authorized in writing by the Commission may conduct any prosecution of any offence under this Act. 1997 3 MLJ 681 at 686 So far as sub-s (1) of each of the foregoing are concerned, they make it clear that the institution of a prosecution under each enactment shall be only with the consent of the Public Prosecutor. The importance of this will appear later in this judgment. However, as may be noted, sub-s (2) of each of the aforesaid sections vests the conduct of prosecutions under each enactment in the hands of persons other than the Public Prosecutor. Accordingly, before the sessions court, counsel for Repco took the point that the two ladies I mentioned earlier had no locus standi to conduct the prosecution in this particular case. It was argued that s 126(2) of the SIA and s 39(2) of the SCA were ultra vires art 145(3) of the Federal Constitution and were void to that extent. The sessions judge, faced with the Constitutional argument, acted under s 30 of the Courts of Judicature Act 1964 and transmitted the record in the case to this court to determine the constitutionality of the two subsections I mentioned a moment ago. That is how I, sitting as a High Court judge, have come to hear this application. So much for the factual background. In order to appreciate the arguments advanced in favour of the applicant before the sessions court, and repeated in substance before me this morning by its counsel En Muhammad Shafee, it is necessary to hearken to the relevant provisions of the written law that govern the subject matter at hand. These are, art 145(3) of the Federal Constitution, s 376 of the Criminal Procedure Code (FMS Cap 6) (8216the CPC8217) and s 380 of the same Code. They are as follows. First, art 145(3) of the Federal Constitution: 145 (3) The Attorney General shall have power, exercisable at his discretion, to institute, conduct or discontinue any proceedings for an offence, other than proceedings before a Syariah court, a native court or a court-martial. Next, s 376 of the CPC: 376 (i) The Attorney General shall be the Public Prosecutor and shall have the control and direction of all criminal prosecutions and proceedings under this Code. (ii) The Solicitor General shall have all powers of a Deputy Public Prosecutor and shall act as Public Prosecutor in case of the absence or inability to act of the Attorney General. (iii) The Public Prosecutor may appoint fit and proper persons to be Deputy Public Prosecutors who shall be under the general control and direction of the Public Prosecutor and may exercise all or any of the rights and powers vested in or exercisable by the Public Prosecutor by or under this Code or any other written law except any rights or powers expressed to be exercisable by the Public Prosecutor personally. (iv) The rights and powers vested in or exercisable by the Public Prosecutor by subsection (iii) and section 68(ii) shall be exercisable by the Public Prosecutor personally. Third, s 380 of the CPC: 1997 3 MLJ 681 at 687 380 Notwithstanding anything in this Chapter contained (i) any public officer may prosecute in any Court in any case or class of cases in which he is by any written law authorized to prosecute in such Court (ii) in summary non-seizable cases in the Court of a Magistrate (a) the Public Prosecutor or a Deputy Public Prosecutor or a Police Officer may appear and conduct any prosecution (b) any officer of any Government department or of any local authority or statutory authority or any person employed by any local authority or statutory authority may appear and conduct any prosecution for an offence against any written law which it is the duty of the said department or authority specially to enforce (c) any private person may appear in person or by advocate or, in the State of Terengganu, by a pleader and prosecute for an offence against his own person or property. It will be seem at once, from a reading of the plain language of art 145(3), that the Supreme Law, namely the Federal Constitution, has committed to the hands of the Attorney General the sole power, exercisable at his discretion, to institute, conduct and discontinue criminal proceedings. The phrase 8216institute, conduct or discontinue8217 was considered by Abdoolcader J (as he then was) in PP v Datuk Harun bin Hj Idris amp Ors 1976 2 MLJ 116. Of the expression 8216conduct8217, his Lordship said (at p 119EI): 8216Conduct8217 in art 145(3) cannot but refer to the conduct of prosecutions in court, as it indeed appears ipsissimisverbis in s 377 of the CPC. And 8216control and direction8217 in s 376(i) of the CPC is in respect of all criminal prosecutions and proceedings, and not of criminal procedure or the jurisdiction of the courts. 8216Conduct8217 of criminal prosecutions and proceedings in art 145(3) cannot connote the regulation of criminal procedure or of the jurisdiction of the courts or the power or discretion to do so. Any contrary contention would in effect in my view be tantamount to the suggestion of the Public Prosecutor arrogating to himself the legislative powers vested in Parliament under item 4 and in particular para (b) there in List I (Federal List) in the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution, with perhaps also the not inconceptible resultant intrusion or at least a more than peripheral incursion into the sphere of art 121(1) of the Constitution which provides that the judicial power of the Federation is vested in two High Courts and in such inferior courts as may be provided by federal law namely, the Subordinate Courts Act 1948 which specifies the subordinate courts and their respective civil and criminal jurisdiction. Pursuing its signification, 8216to conduct8217 means 8216to lead, guide, manage8217 (Re Bhupalli Malliah 1959 AIR AP 477 Pride of Derby v British Celanese Ltd 1953 1 Ch 149 at p 167, per Lord Evershed MR). It conveys the idea of leading and guiding, that is to say, the person who conducts the prosecution determines all important questions of policy involved in the course of the trial and the attitude to be adopted by the prosecution towards material objections raised or demands made by the accused with respect to the evidence. 1997 3 MLJ 681 at 688 Abdoolcader J8217s interpretation of the phrase 8216institute, conduct or discontinue8217 was approved and applied by the Federal Court in PP v Lim Shui Wang amp Ors 1979 1 MLJ 65. It follows from the foregoing discussion that the only authority that is constitutionally entitled to conduct prosecutions is the Attorney General as Public Prosecutor. The adjectival vehicle contained in s 376 and subsequent sections of the CPC put this beyond doubt. The question then arises: Is Parliament entitled by written law to vest the power to conduct criminal prosecutions in an authority other than the Attorney General Encik Muhammad Shafee has argued that this question should receive a negative response. The Public Prosecutor upon whom lies a most onerous burden has considered the arguments and has come to the honest and inescapable conclusion that En Muhammad Shafee is correct in the contentions that he has advanced. Commendably therefore, the Public Prosecutor has instructed his deputy who has appeared before me today to concede that the two subsections referred to do indeed conflict with art 145(3) of the Federal Constitution. However, this being an issue of public law, the agreement between counsel before me does not absolve this court of the duty to investigate the question of its own volition and decide whether the common ground upon which the parties before me stand is indeed maintainable in law. If I come to the conclusion that the impugned subsections are not ultra vires art 145(3), I am at liberty to so declare despite the agreement arrived at between counsel. However, having given the matter my most anxious consideration, I have come to the conclusion that the Public Prosecutor is correct in the concession he has made. Acting with utmost fairness, En Azhar bin Mohamed, deputy public prosecutor, has cited to me cases which he says are useful in making my determination upon the issue at hand. I think I owe it to efforts of counsel to enter upon a discussion of the case which he has cited. The first is Long bin Samat amp Ors v PP 1974 2 MLJ 152 where at p 158AC, Suffian LP had this to say: In our view, this clause from the supreme law clearly gives the Attorney General very wide discretion over the control and direction of all criminal prosecutions. Not only may he institute and conduct any proceedings for an offence, he may also discontinue criminal proceedings that he has instituted, and the courts cannot compel him to institute any criminal proceedings which he does not wish to institute or to go on with any criminal proceedings which he has decided to discontinue. (For the position in England, please see Viscount Dilhorne8217s speech at pp 3233 in Smedleys Ltd v Breed 1974 2 All ER 21). Still less then would the court have power to compel him to enhance a charge when he is content to go on with a charge of a less serious nature. Anyone who is dissatisfied with the Attorney General8217s decision not to prosecute, or not to go on with a prosecution or his decision to prefer a charge for a less serious offence when there is evidence of a more serious offence which should be tried in a higher court, should seek his remedy elsewhere, but not in the courts. 1997 3 MLJ 681 at 689 The second authority which the learned deputy has drawn to my attention is Johnson Tan Han Seng v PP 1977 2 MLJ 66 where, at p 70AF, Suffian LP once again said of art 145(3): Before Merdeka Chap XXXVII of the FMS Criminal Procedure Code and the equivalent provisions of the SS Criminal Procedure Code set out his power. Today, only the FMS Code remains. Section 376(i) thereof provides generally that the Attorney General in his capacity as Public Prosecutor shall have the control and direction of all criminal prosecutions and proceedings under the Code. The next nine sections particularize his powers. For instance, under s 381, he may enter a nolle prosequi after he has received the record of a preliminary enquiry. As noted by this court in Long bin Samat v PP 1974 2 MLJ 152, there was ample judicial authority before Merdeka to show that the Attorney General enjoyed wide discretion in regard to criminal prosecutions. As s 376(i) of the Criminal Procedure Code was already in existence before Merdeka, our constitution-makers could have been content with relying on it alone to preserve after Merdeka the Attorney General8217s pre-Merdeka power, and if they had done so, then it might be arguable that after Merdeka, it must be read subject to art 8: but our constitution-makers were not content to do so. They deliberately wrote art 145(3) into our Constitution which reads: 8216The Attorney General shall have power, exercisable at his discretion, to institute, conduct or discontinue any proceedings for an offence, other than proceedings before a native court or a court-martial.8217 The language of this provision is very wide, for it includes the word 8216discretion8217 which means liberty of deciding as one thinks fit. In view of the deliberate decision of our constitution-makers to write this provision into our Constitution, I do not think that it can be said that it must be read subject to art 8. The importance of the propositions formulated by the learned Lord President in these two cases is that, as a matter of public law, the exercise of discretion by the Attorney General in the context of art 145(3) is put beyond judicial review. In other words, the exercise by the Attorney General of his discretion, in one way or another, under art 145(3), cannot be questioned in the courts by way of certiorari, declaration or other judicial review proceedings. I think that the proposition is not only good law but good policy. For, were it otherwise, upon each occasion that the Attorney General decides not to institute or conduct or discontinue a particular criminal proceedings, he will be called upon to a court of law the reasons for his decision. It will then be the court and not the Attorney General who will be exercising the power under art 145(3). That was surely not the intent on our founding fathers who framed our Constitution for us. Encik Muhammad Shafee has drawn my attention to a passage in a leading work upon the subject. It is a textbook entitled The Attorney General: Politics and the Public Interest by Prof Edwards whose other work, Law Officers of the Crown, has been often quoted with approval by our courts. At p 91 of the text, Prof Edwards expresses the following view. The word 8216conduct8217, it was stated: 1997 3 MLJ 681 at 690 appears to be wider that the phrase 8216carry on8217 and suggests to our minds that when the Director intervenes in a prosecution which has been privately instituted, he may do so not exclusively for the purpose of pursuing it by carrying it on, but also with the object of aborting it that is to say, he may 8216conduct8217 the proceedings in whatever manner may appear expedient in the public interest. The author was there quoting from the judgment of the English Court of Appeal in Raymond v Attorney General 1982 2 WLR 849 at p 853. In my judgment, having regard to the authorities read before me, the expression 8216conduct8217 appearing in art 145(3) and in the two impugned subsections carries the same meaning. Since the Constitution exclusively authorizes the Attorney General to conduct prosecutions, in must follow, as night follows day, that no other authority may be lawfully empowered to exercise that function. Therefore, it is my opinion, that s 126(2) of the SIA is ultra vires art 145(3) of the Federal Constitution save to the extent I shall now indicate. Subsection (2) of s 126 of the SIA refers to the conducting of a prosecution by the Registar of Companies or by someone authorized by such Registrar in writing. As a matter of practice, the Registar of Companies is usually a senior member of the Judicial and Legal Service. He or she is normally gazetted as a deputy public prosecutor. So, if the Registar of Companies is a gazetted deputy public prosecutor and in such capacity conducts a prosecution of an offence under the SIA, that would not be caught by art 145(3) of the Constitution. But the Chairman of the Securities Commission is not placed on an equal footing. He is therefore not authorized lawfully, that is to say constitutionally, to authorize or to conduct prosecutions under the SIA. Neither does s 380(i) of the CPC, relied on by the prosecutors before the sessions court, provide any assistance to the Securities Commission. As pointed out by the learned deputy public prosecutor, the expression 8216public officer8217 appearing in that section refers to members of the public service. While for the purpose of carrying out their duties, members and servants of the Securities Commission are deemed to be public officers, they do not fall within the scope of s 380(i) of the CPC. Encik Muhammad Shafee has very properly drawn my attention to s 126(2) as it originally appeared before the amendment. I think it useful to reproduce the section as it originally stood: 126 (2) Without prejudice to the provision of section 379 of the Criminal Procedure Code, an advocate and solicitor may, with the previous permission in writing of the Public Prosecutor, be employed by the Government to conduct any criminal prosecution, or to appear in any criminal appeal, on behalf of the Government such advocate and solicitor shall be paid by the Government such remuneration as may be agreed between the Government and the advocate and solicitor, and while so employed he shall be deemed to be a 8216public servant8217 within the meaning of the Penal Code. 1997 3 MLJ 681 at 691 Section 126(2) as originally cast did not, in my judgment, contravene art 145(3), because of the careful way in which it was drafted. On the other hand, s 126(2) as presently worded cannot be read harmoniously with art 145(3) to the extent I have earlier indicated. Turning now to s 39(2) of the SCA, it is my judgment that this subsection wholly contravenes art 145(3). By reason of art 4(1) of the Federal Constitution, it being a law which is inconsistent with the Constitution, the subsection gives way. I would declare it void and unconstitutional. In arriving at my decision, I have not overlooked the important principles that govern the interpretation of written constitutions. Our Federal Constitution is a living document written for all time. Its language compresses within it ideas that are manifold and concepts that are multifaceted. The task of the judicial interpreter of such a document is not to place it in a coffin and nail the lid but to breathe life into it and to give effect to the full breadth and width of its great language. That is the spirit in which our courts have approached our Constitution on previous occasions. In this context, I need only mention the decisions of our Supreme Court in Dewan Undangan Negeri Kelantan amp Anor v Nordin bin Salleh amp Anor 1992 1 MLJ 697 Mamat bin Daud amp Ors v Government of Malaysia 1988 1 MLJ 119 Tan Tek Seng v Suruhanjaya Perkhidmatan Pendidikan Malaysiaamp Anor 1996 1 MLJ 261 and Hong Leong Equipment Sdn Bhd v Liew Fook Chuan and another appeal 1996 1 MLJ 481. There is, no doubt a presumption even a strong presumption that an Act of Parliament is constitutional. It would require much conviction to strike down a solemn act of legislation by a democratically elected Parliament. Nevertheless, once it has been amply demonstrated, as has been done in the present case, that an Act of Parliament contains provisions that are in direct conflict with the supreme law, it is the duty of this court to say so clearly and unequivocally. For the reasons I have given thus far, I would declare s 126(2) of the SIA to be unconstitutional, null and void and of no effect, save to the extent earlier indicated. In the same way I would declare s 39(2) of the SCA to be unconstitutional, null and void and of no effect. At the conclusion of arguments, the learned deputy drew my attention to the fact that there has been already some prosecutions pursuant to s 126(2) of the SIA and s 39(2) of the SCA. There are also part heard cases presently pending before the subordinate courts, some of which may be well advanced or nearing conclusion. Now, as a general rule, the declaration of invalidity of a written law on the grounds that it runs foul of the Federal Constitution has retrospective effect. But, the court is fully authorized, having regard to public interest, to make a prospective declaration so as not to render invalid convictions entered and proceedings already concluded before the challenge is taken on the ground on unconstitutionality. 1997 3 MLJ 681 at 692 In my judgment, it will be a manifest injustice to render a retrospective ruling on the invalidity of the two impugned subsections. The declaration as to invalidity I now make shall, therefore, be prospective only and shall include only this case and cases registered from today. In doing so, I act on the authority of the Supreme Court8217s decision in PP v Dato Yap Peng 1987 2 MLJ 311 and Mamat bin Daud v Government of Malaysia. Accordingly, the ruling that I have just pronounced shall take effect from 2 October 1997. Reported by Loo Lai Mee S419 and S422 CPC Ghani and Others v Jones 1969 G. No. 2947 1970 1 Q. B. 693 LOH KOOI CHOON v GOVERNMENT OF MALAYSIA FC KUALA LUMPUR ALI, RAJA AZLAN SHAH AND WAN SULEIMAN FJJ FEDERAL COURT CIVIL APPEAL NO 157 OF 1975 Constitutional Law Fundamental liberties Liberty of person Amendment of Constitution with retrospective effect Whether valid Restrictive Residence Enactment (FMS Cap 39) Federal Constitution, Articles 5, 7 and 159 In this case the appellant had been arrested and detained under a warrant issued under the provisions of the Restricted Residence Enactment. The appellant had not been produced before a Magistrate within twenty-four hours of his arrest. He claimed damages but it was held that no action could be brought against the police officer as he was acting in compliance with a warrant issued by a competent authority. The appellant appealed but before the appeal was heard the Federal Constitution was amended by Act A354/76 which provided in effect that Article 5(4) of the Constitution shall not apply to the arrest or detention of any person under the existing law relating to restricted residence and that this amendment shall have effect from Merdeka Day. It was argued that the amendment was unconstitutional. Parliament can alter the entrenched provisions of Article 5(4) to remove the provision relating to the production before a Magistrate of any arrested person under the Restricted Residence Enactment as long as the process of constitutional amendment as laid down in Article 159(3) is complied with. When that is done it becomes an integral part of the Constitution it is the supreme law, and accordingly it cannot be said to be at variance with itself if Parliament retrospectively affects vested rights or pending proceedings, then it would be the duty of an appellate court to apply the law prevailing on the date of appeal before it. Subject to the constitutional limitation of Article 7 of the Constitution, to wit, protection against retrospective criminal laws and repeated trials, Parliament would be within the ambit of its competence if it deems fit to legislate retrospectively. In view of the demise of Ali F. J. the court asked both counsel for the parties under section 42 of the Courts of Judicature Act, 1964 whether they consented to accept judgments by the remaining judges of the court, it being understood that if there was no majority opinion the proceedings should be re-heard. Both counsel consented. Cases referred to Vacher amp Sons Ltd v London Society of Compositors 1913 AC 107 118 Henry v Geopresco International Ltd 1975 2 All ER 702 718 Assa Singh v Mentri Besar, Johore 1969 2 MLJ 30 IC Golak Nath amp Ors v State of Punjab amp Ors 1967 2 SCR 762 Sri Sankari Prasad Singh Dee v Union of India and State of Bihar 1952 SCR 89 Sajjan Singh v State of Rajasthan 1965 1 SCR 933 Kasavananda Bharati v State of Kerala 1973 SCR Supp 1 Adegbenro v Akintola amp Anor 1963 3 All ER 544 551 Hinds v The Queen 1976 2 WLR 366 373 In re Pulborough School Board, Bourke v Nutt 1894 I QB 725 737 Barber v Pigden 1937 1 KB 664 673 Letang v Cooper 1964 2 All ER 929 933 Latikiro of Buganda v AG 1960 3 All ER 849 851 1977 2 MLJ 187 at 188 Black Clanson v Papierwerke 1975 1 All ER 810 815 Raja Abdul Aziz Addruse ( Dr Yaacob Hussain Merican with him) for the appellant. Lim Beng Choon (Senior Federal Counsel) for the respondent. RAJA AZLAN SHAH FJ It is clear that the question at issue is fraught with political controversy. No doubt the appellant and other persons hold strong views one way or the other on the justice of the impugned Act. I should add that right now no feature of our system of government has caused so much discussion, received so much criticism, and been so frequently misunderstood, than the duties assigned to the courts and the functions which they discharge in guarding the Constitution. For that reason and also because it is rarely that this court is faced with a constitutional question of this kind it is desirable at the outset to make clear the functions of the courts. The question whether the impugned Act is 8220harsh and unjust8221 is a question of policy to be debated and decided by Parliament, and therefore not meet for judicial determination. To sustain it would cut very deeply into the very being of Parliament. Our courts ought not to enter this political thicket, even in such a worthwhile cause as the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution, for as was said by Lord Macnaghten in Vacher amp Sons Ltd v London Society of Compositors 1913 AC 107 118: 8220Some people may think the policy of the Act unwise and even dangerous to the community. Some may think it at variance with principles which have long been held sacred. But a judicial tribunal has nothing to do with the policy of any Act which it may be called upon to interpret. That may be a matter for private judgment. The duty of the court, and its only duty, is to expound the language of the Act in accordance with the settled rules of construction. It is, I apprehend, as unwise as it is unprofitable to cavil at the policy of an Act of Parliament, or to pass a covert censure on the Legislature.8221 It is the province of the courts to expound the law and 8220the law must be taken to be as laid down by the courts, however much their decisions may be criticised by writers of such great distinction8221 per Roskill L. J. in Henry v Geopresco International Ltd 1975 2 All ER 702 718. Those who find fault with the wisdom or expediency of the impugned Act, and with vexatious interference of fundamental rights, normally must address themselves to the legislature, and not the courts they have their remedy at the ballot box. The Constitution is not a mere collection of pious platitudes. It is the supreme law of the land embodying 3 basic concepts: One of them is that the individual has certain fundamental rights upon which not even the power of the State may encroach. The second is the distribution of sovereign power between the States and the Federation, that the 13 States shall exercise sovereign power in local matters and the nation in matters affecting the country at large. The third is that no single man or body shall exercise complete sovereign power, but that it shall be distributed among the Executive, Legislative and Judicial branches of government, compendiously expressed in modem terms that we are a government of laws, not of men. Clause (4) of Article 5 of the Constitution prescribes that a person arrested must be taken before a magistrate within 24 hours so that an independent authority exercising judicial powers may without delay apply its mind to his case. This safeguard is to a large extent covered by the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code but its incorporation in the Constitution is deemed essential for assuring the minorities that their rights would be constitutionally guaranteed and that they shall not entertain any apprehension of the alleged despotism and arbitrariness of the majority and legislative omnipotence. This safeguard equally applies to any person arrested under the Restricted Residence Enactment (Cap. 39) (see Assa Singh v Mentri Besar, Johore 1969 2 MLJ 30 8220but evidently difficulties have arisen in the practical application of the enactment and hence the need for the amendment.8221 (see 1976 2 MLJ xcii). The question is how safe are the provisions in clause (4) of Article 5 from change. This question arose in a case which the Supreme Court in India in IC Golak Nath amp Ors v State of Punjab amp Ors 1967 2 SCR 762 considered en banc. The same question had arisen twice before in India. On the first occasion in Sr i Sankari Prasad Singh Deo v Union of India and State of Bihar 1952 SCR 89 the Supreme Court considered the validity of the Constitution First Amendment Act in 1950. One of the arguments against the validity of the amendment was that the power of amendment granted by the Constitution to Parliament did not extend to the abridgment or removal of any of the fundamental rights because such a law would be hit by Article 13 and void. This argument was not accepted. On the second occasion in Sajjan Singh v State of Rajasthan 1965 1 SCR 933 the Seventeenth Amendment was challenged but this argument, though faintly argued, was not accepted by three judges who constituted the majority. In Golak Nath, supra, another challenge to the same amendment was made and succeeded. By a bare majority of 6:5 it was held that the powers of amendment did not extend to the taking away and abridging of the fundamental rights on the basis that there was no distinction between the Constitution and ordinary law. An Indian writer Tripathi on 8216Amending The Constitution8217. has aptly summarised theGolak Nath constitutional crisis as an intellectual crisis in reality. He said: 8220It does not seem to be a rash hypothesis that if any one around there could successfully state the distinction between the constitution and ordinary law in clear juridical terms at least one judge would have deserted the company of the majority and the power of Parliament to amend the fundamental rights would not have remained eclipsed for six long years 8221 Six years later the Supreme Court in Kasavananda Bharati v State of Kerala 1973 SCR Supp 1 had no difficulty in overruling Golak Nath practically without any dissent. Whatever may be said of other Constitutions, they are ultimately of little assistance to us because our Constitution now stands in its own right and it is in the end the wording of our Constitution itself that 1977 2 MLJ 187 at 189 is to be interpreted and applied, and this wording 8220can never be overridden by the extraneous principles of other Constitutions8221 see Adegbenro v Akintola amp Anor 1963 3 All ER 544 551. Each country frames its constitution according to its genius and for the good of its own society. We look at other Constitutions to learn from their experiences, and from a desire to see how their progress and well-being is ensured by their fundamental law. Counsel for the appellant before us urged that any amendment affecting the fundamentality of the Constitution should be avoided at all costs. According to him that part of the Constitution must not be touched. In my view, a distinction must be made between those parts of the Constitution which the framers thought should not suffer change and those that can be changed. Our Constitution prescribes four different methods for amendment of the different provisions of the Constitution: Some parts of the Constitution can be amended by a simple majority in both Houses of Parliament such as that required for the passing of any ordinary law. They are enumerated in clause (4) of Article 159. and are specifically excluded from the purview of Article 159 The amending clause (5) of Article 159 which requires a two-thirds majority in both Houses of Parliament and the consent of the Conference of Rulers The amending clause (2) of Article 161E which is of special interest to East Malaysia and which requires a two-thirds majority in both Houses of Parliament and the consent of the Governor of the East Malaysian State in question The amending clause (3) of Article 159 which requires a majority of two-thirds in both Houses of Parliament. (For a detailed study of the subject, reference may be made to Tun Suffian, Art Introduction to the Constitution of Malaysia, 2nd edition, Chapter 21). It is therefore plain that the framers of our Constitution prudently realised that future context of things and experience would need a change in the Constitution, and they, accordingly, armed Parliament with 8220power of formal amendment8221. They must be taken to have intended that, while the Constitution must be as solid and permanent as we can make it, there is no permanence in it. There should be a certain amount of flexibility so as to allow the country8217s growth. In any event, they must be taken to have intended that it can be adapted to changing conditions, and that the power of amendment is an essential means of adaptation. A Constitution has to work not only in the environment in which it was drafted but also centuries later. 8220The vanity and presumption of governing beyond the grave is the most ridiculous and insolent of all tyrannies. Man has no property in man neither has any generation or property in the generations which are to follow It is the living, and not the dead, that are to be accommodated.8221 (Thomas Paine, Rights of Man). As fundamental rights are not the same as ordinary rights, they can only be suspended or abridged in the special manner provided for it in the Constitution. In my opinion, the purpose of enacting a written Constitution is partly to entrench the most important constitutional provisions against repeal and amendment in any way other than by a specially prescribed procedure. Their Lordships of the Privy Council in Hinds v The Queen 1976 2 WLR 366 373took the view that constitutions based on the Westminster model, in particular the provisions dealing with fundamental rights, form part of the substantive law of the state and until amended by whatever special procedure is laid down in the constitution for this purpose, impose a fetter upon the exercise by the legislature of the plenitude of its legislative power. A passage from the speech of Lord Diplock who delivered the majority judgment is apposite (page 374): 8220One final general observation: where, as in the instant case, a constitution on the Westminster model represents the final step in the attainment of full independence by the peoples of a former colony or protectorate, the constitution provides machinery whereby any of its provisions, whether relating to fundamental rights and freedoms or to the structure of government and the allocation to its various organs of legislative, executive or judicial powers, may be altered by those peoples through their elected representatives in the Parliament acting by specified majorities, which is generally all that is required, though exceptionally as respects some provisions the alteration may be subject also to confirmation by a direct vote of the majority of the peoples themselves. The purpose served by this machinery for 8216entrenchment8217 is to ensure that those provisions which were regarded as important safeguards by the political parties in Jamaica, minority and majority alike, who took part in the negotiations which led up to the constitution, should not be altered without mature consideration by the Parliament and the consent of a larger proportion of its members than the bare majority required for ordinary laws. So in deciding whether any provisons of a law passed by the Parliament of Jamaica as an ordinary law are inconsistent with the Constitution of Jamaica, neither the courts of Jamaica nor their Lordships8217 Board are concerned with the propriety or expediency of the law impugned. They are concerned solely with whether those provisions, however reasonable and expedient, are of such a character that they conflict with an entrenched provision of the Constitution and so can be validly passed only after the Constitution has been amended by the method laid down by it for altering that entrenched provision.8221 The framers of our Constitution have incorporated fundamental rights in Part II thereof and made them inviolable by ordinary legislation. Unless there is a clear intention to the contrary, it is difficult to visualise that they also intended to make those rights inviolable by constitutional amendment. Had it been intended to save those rights from the operation of clause (3) of Article 159, it would have been perfectly easy to make that intention clear by adding a proviso to that effect. I am inclined to think that they must have had in mind what is of more frequent occurrence, that is, invasion of fundamental rights by the legislative and executive organs of the State by means of laws, rules and regulations made in exercise of legislative power and not the abridgment of such rights by amendment of the Constitution itself in exercise of the power of constitutional amendment. That power, though it has been entrusted to Parliament, has been so hedged about with restrictions that its exercise can only be made after8221mature consideration by Parliament and the consent of a larger proportion of its members than the bare majority required for ordinary laws.8221 1977 2 MLJ 187 at 190 There have also been strong arguments in support of a doctrine of implied restrictions on the power of constitutional amendment. A short answer to the fallacy of this doctrine is that it concedes to the court a more potent power of constitutional amendment through judicial legislation than the organ formally and clearly chosen by the Constitution for the exercise of the amending power. I concede that Parliament can alter the entrenched provisions of clause (4) of Article 5, to wit, removing the provision relating to production before the magistrate of any arrested person under the Restricted Residence Enactment as long as the process of constitutional amendment as laid down in clause (3) of Article 159 is complied with. When that is done it becomes an integral part of the Constitution, it is the supreme law, and accordingly it cannot be said to be at variance with itself. A passage from the Privy Council judgment in Hinds v. The Queen, supra, is of some assistance (page 392): 8220That the Parliament of Jamaica has power to create a court is not open to doubt, but if any of the provisions doing so conflict with the Constitution in its present form, then it could only do so effectively if the Constitution was first amended so as to secure that there ceased to be any inconsistency between the provisions and the Constitution 8221 This reasoning, in my view, is based on the premise that the Constitution as the supreme law, unchangeable by ordinary means, is distinct from ordinary law and as such cannot be inconsistent with itself. It is the supreme law because it settles the norms of corporate behaviour and the principle of good government. This is so because the Federation of Malaya, and later, Malaysia, began with the acceptance of the Constitution by the nine Malay States and the former Settlements of Penang and Melaka, by the acceptance of it by Sabah and Sarawak that entered the Federation in 1963, as 8220the supreme law of the Federation 8220(clause 1 of Article 4).It is thus the most vital working document which we created and possess. If it is urged that the Constitution is on the same level with ordinary law, then the Constitution is an absurd attempt on the part of the framers, to limit a power, in its own nature illimitable. In the context of clause (1) of Article 160, 8220law8221 must be taken to mean law made in exercise of ordinary legislative power and not made in exercise of the power of constitutional amendment under clause (3) of Article 159, with the result that clause (1) of Article 4 does not affect amendments made under clause (3) of Article 159. In conclusion, I hold that clause (4) of Article 5 is nothing but a constitutional protection which can be taken away or abridged only in the manner in which the Constitution provides. There is a world of difference between legislative immunity and a constitutional guarantee. The Constitution, by its very nature, creates the distinction. A constitutional guarantee cannot be wiped out by a simple legislative process as opposed to constitutional amendment. Can an amendment of a clause in the Constitution operate with retrospective effect It was strenuously contended for the appellant that a law which takes away vested right must be presumed to be intended not to operate retrospectively for the simple reason that subsequent change in the law would not prejudice such right. I accept this statement, for which authority is to be found in many cases. But my decision is based on the language of section 4 of the Constitution (Amendment) Act, 1976 (Act A354) which reads: 8220Provided that this Clause shall not apply to the arrest or detention of any person under the existing law relating to restricted residence, and all the provisions of this Clause shall be deemed to have been an integral part of this Article as from Merdeka Day.8221 In so far as an Act of Parliament is concerned, the rule of construction is that in order to determine whether it is retrospective in its operation, the language of the Act itself must be looked into bearing in mind that an Act is not to be construed retrospectively unless it is clear that such was the intention of Parliament. If such was the intention that the Act was to be given retrospective effect even in respect of substantive right or pending proceeding, the courts have no alternative but to give effect to the Act even though the consequences might appear harsh and unjust. The principle that parties are to be governed by the law in force on the date when an action is instituted and any subsequent amendment or alteration cannot affect vested right or pending proceeding, must always be read subject to the corollary that Parliament can always expressly provide that vested right or pending proceeding be affected by the amendment of the law. If Parliament retrospectively affects vested right or pending proceeding, then it would be the duty of an appellate court to apply the law prevailing on the date of appeal before it. There is abundant authority for the proposition that an appellate court is entitled to take into consideration facts and events which have come into existence since the judgment under appeal was delivered: see In re Pulborough School Board, Bourke v Hutt 1894 I QB 725 737 and Barber v Pigden 1937 1 KB 664 673. It cannot be gainsaid that Parliament is endowed with plenary powers of legislation and that it is within the ambit of its competence to legislate with prospective or retrospective effect. Retrospective legislation is one of the incidents of plenary legislative powers and as such is not required to be spelt out in the Constitution. Subject to the constitutional limitation of Article 7 of the Constitution, to wit, protection against retrospective criminal laws and repeated trials, Parliament would be within the ambit of its competence if it deems fit to legislate retrospectively. There is no such restriction of legislative power with regard to restrictive residence. In the absence of any constitutional provision against retrospective legislation with regard to restrictive residence it is not right to argue that Parliament should apply such a restriction. 8220The ultimate touchstone of constitutionality is the Constitution itself and not any general principle outside it8221 per Frankfurter J. The appeal is dismissed. No order as to costs. WAN SULEIMAN FJ The appellant was the plaintiff in High Court K. L. Civil Suit No. 729 of 1973. By a Summons-in-Chambers under Order 25 rule 2 of the Rules of the Supreme Court the following points of law raised in the defence of the respondent/defendant came up for determination before the trial: 1977 2 MLJ 187 at 191 whether the arrest of the plaintiff by the defendant, or its agents or servants on the 19th day of September, 1972 and subsequent detention of the plaintiff without him being produced before a magistrate within 24 hours is lawful by reason only of the validity of the warrant issued by the Minister of Home Affairs dated 13th day of September, 1972 under which the plaintiff was arrested, taking into account the provisions of section 32 of the Police Act No. 41 of 1967 and section 27 of the Prisons Ordinance No. 81 of 1952 and read with section 6 and/or section 39 of the Government Proceedings Ordinance, 1956 and whether the plaintiff8217s claim is bad in law by reason only of the failure on the part of the plaintiff to cite the servant and /or the agent of the defendant in his Statement of Claim. The agreed facts of the case as set out in the judgment of the learned trial judge are as follows: On or about September 19, 1972, the Government of Malaysia by its servants or agents arrested the plaintiff under the authority of a Warrant of Arrest and Detention issued pursuant to the provisions of the Restricted Residence Enactment (F. M.S. Cap. 39) and thereafter detained the plaintiff at the Alor Star prison. On November 21 the same year, the plaintiff caused to be made to the High Court at Alor Star an application for an order that a Writ of Habeas Corpus ad Subjiciendum be issued directing the commissioner of Prisons, Malaysia, to have the plaintiff8217s body produced before the said court or, alternatively, for an order that the said Commissioner to show cause as to why the plaintiff should not be set at liberty. The documents pertaining to the said application were served on the said Commissioner of Prisons and on the Minister of Home Affairs on or about November 24, 1972. Before the application was set for hearing, i. e. on November 29, 1972, the plaintiff was released and allowed to return to his house at about 9.00 a. m. However, at about 4.00 p. m. on the same day, the plaintiff was re-arrested under a fresh Warrant of Arrest and Detention issued by the Minister of Home Affairs. The plaintiff accordingly claims damages against the defendant for wrongful imprisonment or detention from September 19 to November 29, 1972. He also claims for exemplary damages in respect of the second arrest and detention. The learned trial judge held on the first issue, that since the omission on the part of the Police Officer and the Prison Officer in not producing the plaintiff before a magistrate within 24 hours of his arrest was an act in compliance with a warrant issued by a competent authority, they are protected from liability in tort by section 32(1) of the Police Act, 1967 and section 27 of the Prisons Ordinance, 1952. In consequence his Lordship held that no proceedings for damages against them personally can be maintained, so that the defendant in Civil Suit No. 729 of 1973 i. e. the Government of Malaysia is also protected from being sued by virtue of section 6(1) of the Government Proceedings Ordinance, 1956 read in conjunction with section 39 of the same Ordinance. On the second issue his Lordship held for the reasons given in his judgment that the Statement of Claim was nor bad in law. The appellant/plaintiff was ordered to pay costs of the application. The hearing before the learned judge was on October 17, 1975 and judgment delivered the following day. In the memorandum of appeal, learned counsel for the appellant relied largely on the decision of this court in Assa Singh v Mentri Besctr Johore 1969 2 MLJ 30. In that case this court held that though the Restricted Residence Enactment authorising the detention and/or the deprivation of liberty of movement of the subject did not have provisions similar to those in clauses (3) and (4) of Article 5 of the Constitution, this did not make it unconstitutional and that despite such inconsistency with the Constitution, the Enactment was in force, but it must be applied with such adaptations as might be necessary to bring it into accord with the Constitution. It was also held that the provisions of clauses (3) and (4) of Article 5 of the Constitution should be read into the provisions of the Enactment. The memorandum of appeal was filed on or about the 24th of June, 1976. However, with effect from August 27, 1976 Act A354/76 made the following amendment to Article 5(4) of the Constitution by adding this proviso to that clause: 8220Provided that this Clause shall not apply to the arrest or detention of any person under the existing law relating to restricted residence, and all the provisions of this Clause shall be deemed to have been an integral part of this Article as from Merdeka Day.8221 The result of this amendment if valid would be to reverse with retrospective effect the decision in Assa Singh8217s case. Raja Abdul Aziz for the appellant submitted that the overall effect of the old Article 5 would have opened Government to a suit for wrongful imprisonment in this case, but the retrospective operation of the amendment if validly made would be to give Government complete protection. The preliminary point therefore taken by learned counsel was Is this amendment A354/76 constitutional Raja Abdul Aziz8217s submission is briefly this: Under Article 159, the Constitution may be amended by federal law. A law passed to amend the Constitution is law within the meaning of the term 8220law8221 in Article 4 of the Constitution, that unlike the Indian Constitution, because of the manner in which the Indian Article 383 is worded, there is no distinction between a law passed under our Article 159 and a law passed under any other Article of our Constitution. Article 13(1) of the Indian Constitution reads: 8220All laws in force in the territory of India immediately before the commencement of this Constitution, in so far as they are inconsistent with the provisions of this Part, (i. e. Part III 8216Fundamental Liberties8217) shall, to the extent of such inconsistency, be void.8221 Article 13(2) provides that any future law enacted by any authority in India which takes away or abridges 1977 2 MLJ 187 at 192 rights conferred by Part III and any provision thereof shall be void to the extent of such contravention. The definition of law in Article 13(3), though it includes both the ordinary legislative power of Parliament and such other matters as customs and usages, does not include a law amending the Constitution which is placed on an independent footing under Article 368. (See Basu8217s Commentary on the Constitution of India, 5th Ed. Vol. 1). It has been held that the Indian Parliament is competent to make amendments in derogation of fundamental rights by an amending Act in conformity with the requirements of Article 368. (5) (See also Kesavananda Bharati v State of Kerala 1973 SCR Supp 1). In this country, Federal law, he points out, includes (under Article 160) any Act of Parliament. A law passed under Article 159 would have to follow the same legislative procedure as is prescribed in Article 66, like any other Act of Parliament, before it becomes Federal law. He arrives at the conclusion that the power under Article 159, though seemingly wide, is in truth non-existent since any law passed to amend the Constitution must inevitably be inconsistent with the Constitution, and must therefore because of Article 4, be void. He then referred to three decisions: Letang v Cooper 1967 2 SCR 762, Latikiro of Buganda v AG 1952 SCR 89 and Black Clauson v Papierwerke 1965 1 SCR 933 as aids to construction best summed up in the headnote to the last mentioned authority thus: 8220Where there is an ambiguity in a statute the court may have regard to the report of a Committee presented to Parliament containing proposals to legislation which resulted in the amendment of the statute, in order to determine the 8216mischief8217 which the statute was intended to remedy.8221 Having thus laid the foundation, he then referred to various paragraphs of the Report of the Federation of Malaya Constitutional Commission 1957, particularly paras. 161 and 162. The substance of his arguments, if I understand him aright, is that the Fundamental Rights provision constituted a guarantee and once having been so guaranteed, cannot be amended. Whilst conceding that these fundamental liberties are not absolute, he relies on the wording of Articles 7(1), 9(3) and 10 as support for the proposition that the power of Parliament to pass laws to restrict these freedoms must be circumscribed by or be subject to the provisos to be found in Part II only. For instance, Parliament could pass laws to punish the subject for acts or omissions, or to enhance punishment, but not retrospectively (Article 7(1)). The right of every citizen to move freely throughout the country and to reside in any part of it may be modified or be circumscribed by law only for the purposes set out in Articles 9(2) and 9(3). Again the right to freedom of speech guaranteed by Article 10(1)(a), to assemble peaceably by Article 10(1)(b) and to form associations by Article 10(1)(c) can only be restricted by laws passed in accordance with clauses 2(a), 2(b), 2(c) and (3) respectively. Article 149 is relied upon as another buttress to his argument that the guarantees in Part II of the Constitution cannot be whittled away except under the stringent limitations imposed by the Constitution itself. Clause (1) thereof specifically permits such legislation against subversion to be passed 8220notwithstanding that it is inconsistent with any of the provisions, inter alia, of Articles 5, 9 or 108221 in other words, without specific provision on that behalf written into the Constitution, there can be no amendment made to Articles 5, 9 or 10 or the other Articles on Fundamental Liberties coming within Part II of the Constitution. Whilst I would agree that the word 8220law8221 in Article 4 means all laws which Parliament is competent to pass, including federal laws passed to amend the Constitution, I fail to note any ambiguity when Articles 4 and 159 are read together. Paragraph 80 of the Constitutional Commission Report, as one would expect, considered this important matter, and recommended that 8220the method of amending the Constitution should be neither so difficult as to produce frustration nor so easy as to weaken seriously the safeguards which the Constitution provides8221. Article 159(3) provides that (except for the provisions of lesser importance set out in clause 4) all amendments require the support of the votes of not less than of the total number of members in each House. Not only was amendment by a special majority in both Houses recommended by the drafters of the Constitution. One should also look at another provision of the Constitution to see what happens when the special requirements of Article 159 have been satisfied. Like any other Bill, a Constitution amending Bill would become law (under Article 66(5)) on being assented to by the Yang Dipertuan Agung, and as Senior Federal Counsel rightly points out, thenceforth becomes part of the Constitution, becomes integrated therein. The situation therefore cannot arise where it can ever be said to be inconsistent with the Constitution. A more intriguing point raised was that there can be by implication parts of the Constitution which cannot be subject to any form of amendment whatsoever. In taking this line of reasoning, Raja Abdul Aziz appeared to be advancing the majority decision in an Indian Supreme Court decision of Golaknath v State of Punjab 1967 2 SCR 762 wherein 6 out of a special Bench of 11 judges had overruled previous decisions and taken the view that though there is no express exception from the ambit of Article 368, the Fundamental Rights included in Part III of the Indian Constitution cannot, by its very nature be subject to the process of amendment provided for in Article 368, and that if any of such rights is to be amended, a new constituent Assembly must be convened for making a new Constitution or for radically changing it. (See Basu8217s Commentary on the Constitution of India, 5th Edition, Vol. 5, page 495). In the later decision of the Supreme Court Kesavananda v The State of Kerala 1973 SCR Supp 1, it was held inter alia at page 4, by a majority: The decision of the majority in Golaknath that the word 8220law8221 in Article 13(2) include amendments 1977 2 MLJ 187 at 193 to the Constitution and that the article operated as a limitation upon the power to amend the Constitution in Article 368 is erroneous and is over-ruled The power of amendment is plenary (full or complete). It includes within itself the power to add, alter or repeal the various articles of the Constitution, including those fundamental rights The power to amend does not include the power to alter the basic structure or frame-work of the Constitution so as to change its identity (Which on the face of it seems to be inconsistent with issue (iii): There are no inherent or implied limitations on the power of amendment under Article 368. Only issues (i) and (ii) are relevant for the purposes of this appeal. I have referred to issues (iii) and (iv) because counsel for appellant has thought fit to broaden the scope of his arguments by reference to them. It should be noted that the judges supporting the majority view are not the same in all four issues. That there should be such a diversity of views among the leading jurists in India show that what appears at first to be a straightforward matter of interpretation of the written word has become complicated by the doctrine of 8220basic structure or framework8221, those parts of the Constitution which are regarded by proponents of this doctrine as being of special sanctity. Thus Sikri C. J. was (at page 164) 8220driven to the conclusion that the expression 8216amendment of this Constitution8217 in Article 368 means any addition or change in any of the provisions of the Constitution within the broad contours of the Preamble and the Constitution to carry out the objectives in the Preamble and the Directive Principles. Applied to fundamental rights, it would mean that while fundamental rights cannot be abrogated reasonable abridgements of fundamental rights can be effected in the public interest.8221 and at page 165 8220The true position is that every provision of the Constitution can be amended provided in the result the basic foundation and structure of the Constitution remains the same.8221 The basic structure, he said, consists of: (1) Supremacy of the Constitution (2) Republican and Democratic form of Government (3) Secular character of the Constitution (4) separation of powers between the Legislature, the executive and the judiciary and (5) Federal character of the Constitution. The restriction upon the amending power of the Indian Parliament, according to this view arises from what is contained in the Preamble to the Indian Constitution. Coming back to the issue before us, there is thus persuasive authority that whilst abrogation of the fundamental rights may not come within the ambit of our Article 159, reasonable abridgement of such rights are constitutional that Parliament should decide when such amendment is necessary and it is not for this court to question the wisdom or need for such amendment. I do not feel that the issue before this court would call for my view on whether there are indeed inherent or implied limitations to the power of amendment under Article 159, and must perforce confine myself to the issue before us viz. is the amendment to the fundamental right set out in Article 5 by Act A354/76 constitutionalNor do I feel called upon to answer the broader issue of whether the power to amend includes the power to abrogate a fundamental right. The power to amend would not, in this country, be restricted by anything set out in a Preamble for there is no Preamble to our Constitution. It seems to me to be clear that if there is to be any restriction to the right to amend any of the fundamental rights set out in Part II, such restriction would have been. set out in one of the various clauses of Article 159 itself. Another point raised by learned counsel for the appellant is the constitutional validity of this retrospective amendment. Counsel concedes that this is not a criminal matter so that there is no question of violating Article 7. His reference to the Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. 16A, page 90, on Retrospective Laws does not further his cause, for even in the U. S. in the absence of express provision in the U. S. Constitution, no law is invalid merely because it is retrospective in operation (see page 94, section 415). Mr. Lim has drawn our attention to a passage in Bindra8217s Interpretation of Statutes, 6th Ed. page 862, where under the heading 8220Prospective and retrospective operation8221 the following excerpt is relevant: 8220Constitutional provisions, like statutes, always operate prospectively and not retrospectively unless words used clearly indicate that a retrospective intention is intended But an express intention that a constitution shall operate retrospectively will be enforced. Nor will a retrospective intention clearly manifest be avoided by consideration of inconvenience or hardship.8221 The effect of this amendment to Article 5 is to deprive the appellant of the protection afforded to him by the ruling of this court in Assa Singh8217s case, that he cannot sue for damages for what would otherwise be unlawful detention for the period ending November 29, 1972, since it is clear that this amendment is constitutionally valid. This appeal in substance questions the validity of a law made by Parliament, in the words of Article 4(3) of the Constitution, 8220on the ground that it makes provision with respect to any matter with respect to which Parliament has no power to make laws 8221 What Raja Abdul Aziz says amounts to this: Parliament cannot amend any of the Fundamental Liberties Articles beyond what is expressly permitted by Part II itself. I should therefore treat this appeal as a proceeding for a declaration such as is envisaged in Article 4(3) and I declare that the amendment to Article 5(4) by Act A354/76 is valid. I would therefore dismiss the appeal. No order as to costs. Solicitors: Rithauddeen amp Aziz. Criminal Procedure Prosecution Consent of public prosecutor Charge amended from s 39B(1)(a) to s 39B(1)(c) of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 Amendment made by deputy public prosecutor at trial Whether trial a nullity Whether informer should have been called to testify Whether appellants acted together with common intention in preparing sale of cannabis The appellants in both the appeals herein were convicted under s 39B(1)(c) of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1952 (DDA) and sentenced to death. Their appeal to the Federal Court was against the dismissal of their respective appeals to the Court of Appeal against conviction and sentence. Initially both appellants were charged under s 39B(1)(a) of the DDA but at the end of the prosecutions case the deputy public prosecutor amended the charge to one under s 39B(1)(c), to wit, that they, in furtherance of a common intention, carried out an act preparatory to or for the purpose of trafficking in 2,996.4g cannabis. The prosecutions narration of the events was that a chief inspector of police (PW10), posing as a drug buyer, was introduced by his informer (Mud) to the second appellant to discuss the purchase of cannabis. At the appointed time and place for the sale and purchase to take place PW10 met with both appellants. While PW10 and the second appellant waited, the first appellant went to get the drugs and returned in about 20 minutes carrying a bag from which the first appellant took out and showed the cannabis to PW10. PW10 signalled the police party that lay in ambush observing the proceedings. The appellants fled on seeing the police approaching the first appellant throwing away the bag he was carrying as he fled. Both appellants were apprehended by the police after a brief struggle. In calling for their defence the trial court found as a fact that both appellants had a common intention in acting together to ensure the sale of the cannabis and that they had knowledge of the drugs as inferred from their attempts to resist arrest and escape the police party and the act of the first appellant in throwing away the bag containing the drugs. Their defence failed to cast any reasonable doubt on the prosecutions case. In the Federal Court the appellants submitted that (i) the trial was a nullity because the public prosecutor had not consented to the charge being amended (ii) the prosecution ought to have called the informer Mud to testify and/or offered him to the defence (iii) as the second appellant only negotiated the sale of the cannabis with PW10 and was never in possession of the drugs he was not involved in trafficking and (iv) as the first appellant did not participate in the negotiations or in the preparatory act but only had custody and control of the cannabis he should be found guilty of only possession and not trafficking. The prosecution replied that (i) consent to the amended charge was superfluous as the prosecution was conducted by a deputy public prosecutor (ii) Mud was not an agent provocateur but only an informer whose identity was protected by s 40 of the DDA. Mud merely introduced the second appellant to PW10 and did nothing else and (iii) the appellants acted together, with a common intention, to sell the cannabis to PW10. Held, dismissing the appeals and affirming the appellants conviction and sentence: Consent of the public prosecutor to the amended charge was superfluous as the prosecution was conducted by the deputy public prosecutor in which case the consent of the public prosecutor was implicit in his actions and no further written consent of the public prosecutor was required:Garmaz s/o Pakhar amp Anor v Public Prosecutor 1995 3 SLR 701 followed. Public Prosecutor v Lee Chwee Kiok 1979 1 MLJ 45 not followed (see paras 35 amp 33). There was no necessity for the evidence of Mud in the narrative of the prosecutions case. It was not disputed that the only role Mud played was to introduce PW10 to the second appellant. Just because Mud was known to the second appellant did not make him an agent provocateur (see para 43). In this case the trafficking was the sale of cannabis or the purchase of it by PW10. What transpired on the night of 5 April 1996 was the final chapter in the preparation of the trafficking of the drugs which constituted the supply and delivery of 3kg of the cannabis by the first appellant for the purpose of both the appellants jointly handing it over to PW10 in exchange for payment as earlier agreed. There was common intention to ensure the sale of the cannabis to PW10 (see paras 48 amp 49). To constitute actual delivery it was not necessary that the agreed price had to be paid upon or before the physical delivery of the drugs. Here, the transaction was completed when the appellants produced the cannabis to PW10 and were only waiting for payment (see para 50). There was no misdirection in the evaluation of the evidence adduced or in the standard of proof applied by the trial judge in coming to his decision. Overwhelming evidence was adduced showing the roles played by the appellants to make the cannabis available to PW10 for purchase. The very act of each of them attempting to flee from the scene to avoid arrest by the police was a clear indication both of them knew what they were dealing in with PW10 (see paras 51 amp 52). Perayu-perayu di dalam kedua-dua rayuan telah disabitkan di bawah s 39B(1)(c) Akta Dadah Berbahaya 1952 (ADB) dan telah dihukum mati. Rayuan mereka kepada Mahkamah Persekutuan adalah terhadap penolakan rayuan mereka masing-masing kepada Mahkamah Rayuan terhadap sabitan dan hukuman. Pada awalnya, kedua-dua perayu telah dituduh di bawah s 39B(1)(a) ADB tetapi pada akhir kes pihak pendakwaan timbalan pendakwa raya telah meminda tuduhan kepada satu yang tertakluk di bawah s 39B(1)(c), iaitu, bahawa mereka, sebagai lanjutan niat bersama, telah melakukan tindakan persediaan kepada atau bagi tujuan pengedaran 2,996.4g kanabis. Penceritaan kejadian pihak pendakwaan adalah bahawa ketua penyiasat polis (PW10), menyamar sebagai pembeli dadah, telah diperkenalkan oleh pemberi maklumat (Mud) kepada perayu kedua untuk berbincang tentang pembelian kanabis. Pada masa dan tempat yang ditetapkan bagi jual beli tersebut, PW10 bertemu dengan kedua-dua perayu. Sementara PW10 dan perayu kedua sedang menunggu, perayu pertama pergi mendapatkan dadah dan pulang selepas 20 minit membawa beg di mana perayu mengeluarkan dan menunjukkan kanabis kepada PW10. PW10 memberi isyarat kepada pihak polis yang sedang berselindung di dalam belukar dan memerhatikan prosiding tersebut. Perayu-perayu terus melarikan diri apabila melihat kedatangan polis perayu pertama membuang beg yang dibawanya semasa dia melarikan diri. Kedua-dua perayu telah ditangkap oleh polis selepas pergelutan singkat. Dalam memanggil pembelaan mereka, mahkamah perbicaraan mendapati adalah fakta bahawa kedua-kedua perayu mempunyai niat bersama untuk bertindak bersesama untuk memastikan jualan kanabis dan bahawa mereka mempunyai pengetahuan tentang dadah tersebut melihatkan kepada percubaan mereka untuk mengelakkan diri daripada ditahan dan melarikan diri daripada pihak polis dan tindakan perayu pertama membuang beg yang mengandungi dadah tersebut. Pembelaan mereka gagal untuk meletakkan sebarang keraguan berpatutan ke atas kes pendakwaan. Dalam Mahkamah Persekutuan, perayu-perayu berhujah bahawa (i) perbicaraan adalah terbatal oleh kerana pendakwa raya tidak memberi kebenaran terhadap tuduhan yang dipinda (ii) pihak pendakwaan sepatutnya memanggil pemberi maklumat Mud untuk memberi keterangan dan/atau menawarkannya kepada pembelaan (iii) memandangkan perayu kedua hanya berunding tentang penjualan kanabis dengan PW10 dan tidak pernah dalam milikan dadah tersebut, dia tidak terbabit dalam pengedaran dan (iv) memandangkan perayu pertama tidak terlibat dalam perundingan atau tindakan persediaan tetapi hanya mempunyai jagaan dan kawalan kanabis tersebut, dia patut didapati bersalah hanya untuk milikan dan bukan untuk pengedaran. Pihak pendakwaan membalas bahawa (i) kebenaran kepada tuduhan yang dipinda tidak diperlukan memandangkan pendakwaan telah dilakukan oleh timbalan pendakwa raya (ii) Mud bukanlah ejen perangkap tetapi hanya pemberi maklumat yang mana identitinya dilindungi oleh s 40ADB. Mud sekadar memperkenalkan perayu kedua kepada PW10 dan tidak lebih dari itu dan (iii) perayu-perayu bertindak bersama-sama, dengan niat bersama untuk menjual kanabis kepada PW10. Diputuskan, menolak rayuan dan mengesahkan sabitan dan hukuman perayu-perayu: Kebenaran pendakwa raya untuk tuduhan yang dipinda adalah tidak perlu memandangkan pendakwaan telah dilakukan oleh timbalan pendakwa raya di mana kebenaran pendakwa raya adalah tersirat daripada tindakannya dan kebenaran bertulis selanjutnya oleh pendakwa raya adalah tidak perlu: Garmaz s/o Pakhar amp Anor v Public Prosecutor 1995 3 SLR 701 diikut Public Prosecutor v Lee Chwee Kiok 1979 1 MLJ 45 tidak diikut (lihat perenggan 35 amp 33). Keterangan Mud adalah tidak perlu di dalam penceritaan kes pihak pendakwaan. Tidak dapat dipertikaikan bahawa peranan yang dimainkan oleh Mud hanyalah untuk memperkenalkan PW10 kepada perayu kedua. Hanya kerana Mud dikenali oleh perayu kedua tidak bermakna dia adalah ejen perangkap (lihat perenggan 43). Dalam kes ini pengedaran tersebut adalah penjualan kanabis atau pembeliannya oleh PW10. Apa yang berlaku pada malam 5 April 1996 adalah bab terakhir dalam persediaan untuk pengedaran dadah yang mana membawa kepada bekalan dan penyerahan 3kg kanabis oleh perayu pertama bagi tujuan untuk diberikan kepada PW10 oleh kedua-dua perayu sebagai ganti untuk pembayaran yang dipersetujui sebelum itu. Terdapat niat bersama untuk memastikan penjualan kanabis kepada PW10(lihat perenggan 48 amp 49). Untuk membentuk penyerahan sebenar, adalah tidak perlu bahawa harga yang dipersetujui hendaklah dibayar apabila atau sebelum penyerahan fizikal dadah tersebut. Di sini, transaksi telah disempurnakan apabila perayu-perayu menyediakan kanabis kepada PW10 dan hanya menunggu untuk bayaran (lihat perenggan 50). Tidak terdapat salah arah dalam penilaian keterangan yang dikemukakan atau standard pembuktian yang digunakan oleh hakim bicara dalam membuat keputusannya. Keterangan kukuh yang dikemukakan menunjukkan peranan yang dimainkan oleh perayu-perayu untuk menyediakan kanabis untuk pembelian oleh PW10. Tindakan setiap daripada mereka yang cuba untuk melarikan diri daripada tempat kejadian untuk mengelakkan diri daripada ditahan oleh polis adalah petunjuk yang jelas bahawa kedua-duanya tahu akan urusniaga mereka dengan PW10 (lihat perenggan 51 amp 52). 21. Seksyen 43 Akta Penapisan Filem 2002 memperuntukkan seperti berikut: 43. Tiada pendakwaan berkenaan dengan apa-apa kesalahan d bawah Akta ini atau mana-mana peraturan yang dibuat di bawah Akta ini boleh dimulakan kecuali oleh atau dengan keizinan bertulis Pendakwa Raya. 22. Sepanjang prosiding perbicaraan di hadapan Majistret, Mahkamah Majistret Jenayah 2, Kuala Lumpur, pihak pendakwaan tidak mengemukakan izin pendakwaan secara bertulis dan ini adalah bercanggah dengan peruntukkan Seksyen 43 Akta Penapisan Filem 2002. Ini dibuktikan dengan senarai ekshibit Jilid 2 Rekod Rayuan-izin pendakwaan tidak dikemukakan kepada Mahkamah dan ditanda sebagai ekshibit. 23. Walaubagaimanapun setelah menerima Rekod Rayuan pada 5.5.2011, pihak Perayu mendapati bahawa salinan izin pendakwaan telah dimasukkan ke dalam Lampiran Dokumen ( mukasurat 115 Rekod Rayuan Jilid 1 ) dan ini merupakan kali pertama pihak Perayu melihat salinan izin pendakwaan tersebut. 24. Terdapat kecacatan material pada izin pendakwaan tersebut di mana izin pendakwaan diberi oleh seorang timbalan pendakwaraya yang bernama Mazelan Jamaludin tetapi ditandatangani oleh seorang timbalan pendakwaraya bernama Nor Aizam. 25. Adalah menjadi hujahan Perayu bahawa izin pendakwaan mengikut peruntukkan Seksyen 43 Akta Penapisan Filem 2002 adalah mandatori dan ketinggalan untuk mengemukakannya menjadikan prosiding perbicaraan Kes Tangkap Tersebut satu (dengan izin) nullity. 26. Pihak Perayu merujuk kepada kes Abdul Hamid v PP 1956 MLJ 231 (di mukasurat 3 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Perayu) Smith J membuat pemerhatian seperti berikut: There is an essential difference to my mind between a sanction and a consent. A prosecution can be sanctioned without any deep consideration of the particular case. full consideration is required for consent since consent is an act of reason, accompanied with deliberation, the mind weighing, as in a balance, the good and evil on each side (Stround 3 rd Ediiton vol 1 page 582). The sanction was therefore no evidence of consent. 27. Pihak Perayu turut bersandarkan kepada kes Public Prosecutor v Lee Chwee Kiok 1979 1 MLJ 45 (di mukasurat 2 Ikatan Otoriti Pihak Perayu) di mana mahkamah telah memutuskan bahawa prosiding adalah terbatal apabila tiada kebenaran untuk pertuduhan yang dipinda : The question is whether the court has jurisdiction to proceed with the trial on the amended charge without a fresh consent by the Public Prosecutor. As the matter is res integra I proceeded with the trial to save the public expense, the witnesses and jury being present in court. It will be observed that although the original and amended charges are two distinct offences, they are both created by the same section of the law viz. section 39B(1) and both carry the same penalty. Both require the consent of the Public Prosecutor under section 39B(3). The learned Deputy Public Prosecutor argued that the amendment was technical and as the Public Prosecutor had given his consent on the original charge he was at liberty to amend the charges in the manner he did. انا لا اظن ذلك. It was held in Abdul Hamid v Public Prosecutor 1956 MLJ 231 that a consent to prosecute is an act of reason, accompanied with deliberation, the mind weighing, as in a balance, the good and evil on each side. The Public Prosecutor has clearly exercised his mind in respect of the original charge when he gave his consent to prosecute some four months after the alleged offence. It was incumbent on him however to exercise the same degree of deliberation in respect of the amended charge. He has not done so. In Lim Seo v Regina 1962 MLJ 304 counsel was given sanction to prosecute undersection 379 of the Penal Code but he proceeded under section 381 of the Penal Code instead. It was held that counsel cannot depart from the specific authorisation of the Public Prosecutor. It seems to me that the same principles apply here. The facts of the case were fully before the Public Prosecutor at the time of giving his consent and he could have elected to proceed on the amended charge then. He did not do so. It would appear therefore that the Public Prosecutor has not given his consent to prosecute under the amended charge. That being so, the trial is a nullity on the authority of Lyn Hong Yap v Public Prosecutor 1956 MLJ 226. 8220Where there is no jurisdiction, there can be no discretion, for discretion is incident to jurisdiction.8221 Piper v. Pearson, 2 Gray 120, cited in Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 20 L. Ed. 646 (1872) A judge must be acting within his jurisdiction as to subject matter and person, to be entitled to immunity from civil action for his acts. Davis v. Burris, 51 Ariz. 220, 75 P.2d 689 (1938) Generally, judges are immune from suit for judicial acts within or in excess of their jurisdiction even if those acts have been done maliciously or corruptly the only exception being for acts done in the clear absence of all jurisdiction. Gregory v. Thompson, 500 F2d 59 (C. A. Ariz. 1974) When a judicial officer acts entirely without jurisdiction or without compliance with jurisdiction requisites he may be held civilly liable for abuse of process even though his act involved a decision made in good faith, that he had jurisdiction. State use of Little v. U. S. Fidelity amp Guaranty Co. 217 Miss. 576, 64 So. 2d 697. the particular phraseology of the constitution of the United States confirms and strengthens the principle, supposed to be essential to all written constitutions, that a law repugnant to the constitution is void, and that courts, as well as other departments, are bound by that instrument. Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803). The doctrine of judicial immunity originated in early seventeenth-century England in the jurisprudence of Sir Edward Coke. In two decisions, Floyd amp Barker and the Case of the Marshalsea, Lord Coke laid the foundation for the doctrine of judicial immunity. Floyd amp Barker, 77 Eng. Rep. 1305 (1607 The Case of the Marshalsea, 77 Eng. Rep. 1027 (1612) were both cases right out of the Star Chamber. Cokes reasoning for judicial immunity was presented in four public policy grounds: 1. Finality of judgment 2. Maintenance of judicial independence 3. Freedom from continual calumniations and, 4. Respect and confidence in the judiciary. The Marshalsea presents a case where Coke denied a judge immunity for presiding over a case in assumpsit. Assumpsit is a common-law action for recovery of damages for breach of contract. Coke then explained the operation of jurisdiction requirement for immunity: When a Court has (a) jurisdiction of the cause, and proceeds iverso ordine or erroneously, there the party who sues, or the officer or minister of the Court who executes the precept or process of the Court, no action lies against them. But (b) when the Court has not jurisdiction of the cause, there the whole proceeding is before a person who is not a judge, and actions will lie agai nst them without any regard of the precept or process Although narrowing the availability of judicial immunity, especially in courts of limited jurisdiction, Coke suggested that there was a presumption of jurisdiction and that the judge must have been aware that jurisdiction was lacking. Thus, questions of personam, rem and res jurisdiction are always a proper issue before the court to obviate the defense that the court had no way to know they lacked jurisdiction. If a judge acts without subject-matter jurisdiction, the judge is acting unlawfully, he/she has committed an unlawful interference with one8217s person, property, or rights. Is the judge who acts without subject-matter jurisdiction then anything but a common criminal And all orders and judgments issued by a judge who acts without subject-matter jurisdiction are, as a matter of law, void . Ranks of Jedi Members of the order progress through four tiers of rank, at times referred to as levels: Youngling . A Jedi Youngling is a child, a Jedi-in-training, learning to control the Force and wield a lightsaber. The title of 8220Youngling8221 is the first part of a Jedi training. Younglings were seen training with Jedi Grand Master Yoda in a scene from Attack of the Clones and when Anakin Skywalker turns to the dark side in Revenge of the Sith . Padawan . A Youngling who successfully completes training then undergoes Padawan training under the tutelage of a Jedi Knight (or Jedi Master in some cases). These are also called 8220Apprentices8221 and 8220Padawan Learners8221. As a rite of passage and the final test before the trials to knighthood, Padawans must build their own lightsabers. In the Old Republic, Padawans usually wore a hair braid on the right side of their head which was removed with a lightsaber upon attaining knighthood. They also served as commanders in the Clone Wars. The term Padawan appears to originate in Sanskrit and can be understood as learner,8221 both in Sanskrit and by contemporary native speakers of Sanskrit-based languages. 1 Jedi Knight . Disciplined and experienced, Jedi Knights become so only when they have completed 8220the trials8221 (final tests). This, the most common rank, is interchangeably referred to as 8220Jedi8221, 8220Jedi Knight8221 and 8220Master Jedi8221 (although the latter only used by Younglings and Padawans when addressing Jedi Knights or above). The five tests are usually known as Trial of Skill, the Trial of Courage, the Trial of the Flesh, the Trial of Spirit, and the Trial of Insight or Knowledge. 2 In Return of the Jedi . Master Yoda gives his apprentice, Luke Skywalker, the trial of confronting Darth Vader for a second time so he might become a full-fledged Knight. Occasionally, performing an extraordinary (usually heroic) act can earn a Padawan learner Jedi status, such as when Obi-Wan Kenobi defeats the Sith Lord Darth Maul. By the time of the movies distinct battle classes were not necessary as the Republic had not seen war in over a thousand years, and the title of Knight was simply a rank once again. Jedi Master . A Jedi Knight may become a Jedi Master after successfully training a Padawan learner to Knight status. Though this is the most common manner, there are other ways of attaining the rank. Also, 8220Master Jedi8221 is the common honorific. Jedi Grand Master . Grand Master is usually the oldest, most experienced and best trained of all Jedi. A Grand Master is chosen by the Jedi council. In Star Wars . Yoda is the grand master. Jedi Master Mace Windu was next in line to become Grand Master until he was killed by Palpatine (Darth Sidious) in Revenge of the Sith . Additional statures High Council Member . A Jedi Master may be granted the further stature of a position on the Jedi High Council (known less formally as the 8216Jedi Council8217). When a Council Member vacates his or her seat, the council looks for an exemplary Jedi Master to fill the empty position. Presiding Council Members elect prospective candidates when openings become available. According to the Dorling Kindersley guide to Star Wars Episode I: The Phantom Menace . some members retained permanent positions on the council (like Yoda and Mace Windu), while the rest served limited terms, after which they stepped down and another member would be elected in their place. There have been occasional exceptions to the requirement that Jedi attain the Master rank prior to gaining a council seat, such as Anakin Skywalker and Ki Adi Mundi. General . During the Clone Wars, many Jedi Knights and Masters were commissioned into the Grand Army of the Republic with the rank of General. Princess Leia addresses Obi-Wan as 8220General Kenobi8221 in the original film, reminding him of his service to her adoptive father, Senator Bail Organa. Commander . The Padawan learners were also commissioned into the Grand Army of the Republic and were given this rank, officially outranking all clones but subordinate to their Jedi masters Post navigation MOHAMAD IZAHAM MOHAMED YATIM Knowledge is Free to Everyone Everything in here is free of charge. There is no charge for Awesomeness or Attractiveness - The Dragon Warrior - Kung Fu Panda 1 Research Funds Sponsorship Requested by my readers who want to sponsor to increase my researches, you are welcome. Please send to The Research Funds Sponsorship into My Paypal Account: donateqassimbaba - Thank you to my donors who sent at least 1USD each to increase my research fund. Mobile:(006)-019-2787830 IM:codegeniushotmail Upon requests by my readers, I would like to display my mobile number and IM ID. Visit My Website anticyberforensics. wordpress (We Generate Money Out of Chaos and Turbulence) Scientific Evidence and Law The contrasts between law and science are often described in binary terms: science seeks truth, the law does justice science is descriptive, but law is prescriptive science emphasises progress, whereas the law emphasises process. Comparisons between science and the law often celebrate sciences unique commitment to systematic testing of observations and its willingness to submit its conclusions to critical probing and falsification. Hence, the Intellect, Reason and Judgment as conclusions and verdicts of the Cognitive Faculties by which laws are prescribed a priori and science is described as the scientific cognition a priori within a posteriori truth. (Mohamad Izaham Mohamed Yatim, Digital Metadata, Timestamp and The Theory of Relativity - Faculty of Mathematics, University of Cambridge, 15 JJ Thomson Avenue, Cambridge CB3 9EW United Kingdom, Published Nov. 2010) Wissenschaftlicher Beweis und Gesetz Die Kontraste zwischen Gesetz und Wissenschaft werden hufig in den binren Bezeichnungen beschrieben: Wissenschaft sucht Wahrheit, das Gesetz tut Gerechtigkeit Wissenschaft ist beschreibend, aber Gesetz ist vorschreibend Wissenschaft hebt Fortschritt hervor, whrend t er Gesetz hervorhebt Proze. Vergleiche zwischen Wissenschaft und dem Gesetz feiern hufig einzigartige Verpflichtung der Wissenschaft zur systematischen Prfung von Beobachtungen und seine Bereitwilligkeit, seine Zusammenfassungen beim kritischen Prfen und bei der Flschung einzureichen. Folglich wird der Intellekt, der Grund und das Urteil als Zusammenfassungen und Urteilssprche der kognitiven Lehrkrper, von denen Gesetzen einem priori und eine Wissenschaft vorgeschrieben werden, als das wissenschaftliche Erkennen ein priori innerhalb a posteriori der Wahrheit beschrieben. (Mohamad Izaham Mohamed Yatim, Digital Metadata, Zeitstempel und die Theorie Relativitt - der Universitt von Cambridge, 15 JJ Thomson von Allee, Cambridge CB3 9EW Vereinigtes Knigreich, November 2010) vidence et loi scientifiques Les contrastes entre la loi et la science sont souvent dcrits en termes binaires. la science cherche la vrit, la loi fait la justice la science est descriptive, mais la loi est prscriptive la science souligne le progrs, tandis que la loi souligne des comparaisons de processus entre la science et la loi clbrer souvent lengagement unique de la science lessai systmatique des observations et sa bonne volont de soumettre ses conclusions au sondage et la falsification critiques. Par consquent, lintellect, la raison et le jugement comme conclusions et verdicts des corps enseignant cognitifs par lesquels des lois sont prescrites a priori et la science est dcrit comme connaissance scientifique a priori dans a posteriori la vrit. (Mohamad Izaham Mohamed Yatim, Digital Metadata, horodateur et la thorie duniversit de relativit - de Cambridge, avenue de 15 JJ Thomson, Cambridge CB3 9EW Royaume-Uni, dit novembre 2010) Evidncia e lei cientficas Os contrastes entre a lei e a cincia so descritos frequentemente em termos binrios: a cincia procura a verdade, a lei faz a justia a cincia descritiva, mas a lei prescriptive a cincia emfatiza o progresso, visto que a lei emfatiza comparaes do processo entre a cincia e a lei comemorar frequentemente o compromisso original da cincia a testar sistemtico das observaes e o seu voluntariedade submeter suas concluses a sondar e a falsification crticos. Daqui, o intellect, a razo e o julgamento como concluses e verdicts das faculdades cognitive por que as leis so prescritas a priori e a cincia so descritos como a cognio cientfica a priori dentro a posteriori da verdade. (Mohamad Izaham Mohamed Yatim, Digital Metadata, timestamp e a teoria da universidade do relativity - de Cambridge, avenida de 15 JJ Thomson, Cambridge CB3 9EW Reino Unido, Nov. 2010) Prova e legge scientifiche I contrasti fra legge e la scienza sono descritti spesso nei termini binari: la scienza cerca la verit, la legge fa la giustizia la scienza descrittiva, ma la legge normativa la scienza d risalto al progresso, mentre la legge d risalto ai confronti di processo fra la scienza e la legge celebrare spesso limpegno unico della scienza alla prova sistematica delle osservazioni e la relativa compiacenza presentare le relative conclusioni al sondaggio ed alla falsificazione critici. Quindi, il intellect, il motivo ed il giudizio come conclusioni e verdetti delle facolt conoscitive da cui le leggi si prescrivono a priori e la scienza descritto come la cognizione scientifica a priori allinterno a posteriori della verit. (Mohamad Izaham Mohamed Yatim, Digital Metadata, timestamp e la teoria delluniversit di relativit - di Cambridge, un viale di 15 JJ Thomson, Cambridge CB3 9EW Regno Unito, pubblicato novembre del 2010) : , , , . . , , a priori a priori a posteriori . (Mohamad Izaham Mohamed Yatim, Metadata, timestamp - cambridge, 15 JJ Thomson, cambridge CB3 9EW , NOV 2010) Evidencia y ley cientficas Los contrastes entre la ley y la ciencia se describen a menudo en trminos binarios: la ciencia busca verdad, la ley hace la justicia la ciencia es descriptiva, pero la ley es preceptiva la ciencia acenta progreso, mientras que t l ley acenta proceso Los omparisons de C entre la ciencia y la ley celebran a menudo la comisin nica de la ciencia a la prueba sistemtica de observaciones y su buena voluntad de someter sus conclusiones a sondar y a la falsificacin crticos. Por lo tanto, la intelecto, la razn y el juicio como conclusiones y los veredictos de las facultades cognoscitivas por quienes los leyes son prescritos a priori y la ciencia se describe como la cognicin cientfica a priori dentro a posteriori de la verdad. (Mohamad Izaham Mohamed Yatim, Digital Metadata, timestamp y la teora de la universidad de la relatividad - de Cambridge, avenida de 15 JJ Thomson, Cambridge CB3 9EW Reino Unido, noviembre de 2010) Prova e legge scientifiche I contrasti fra legge e la scienza sono descritti spesso nei termini binari: la scienza cerca la verit, la legge fa la giustizia la scienza descrittiva, ma la legge normativa la scienza d risalto al progresso, mentre la legge d risalto ai confronti di processo fra la scienza e la legge celebrare spesso limpegno unico della scienza alla prova sistematica delle osservazioni e la relativa compiacenza presentare le relative conclusioni al sondaggio ed alla falsificazione critici. Quindi, il intellect, il motivo ed il giudizio come conclusioni e verdetti delle facolt conoscitive da cui le leggi si prescrivono a priori e la scienza descritto come la cognizione scientifica a priori allinterno a posteriori della verit. (Mohamad Izaham Mohamed Yatim, Digital Metadata, timestamp e la teoria delluniversit di relativit - di Cambridge, un viale di 15 JJ Thomson, Cambridge CB3 9EW Regno Unito, novembre del 2010) : t . posteriori (Mohamad Izaham Mohamed Yatim Metadata 15 JJ Thomson CB3 9EW 2010 11 - ) : , , , . , (Mohamad Izaham Mohamed Yatim, Metadata, , 15 JJ Thomson , CB3 9EW - , 2010 11) Willard Van Orman Quine Indiscernibility of Identicals - a logical principle which states that if A and B are identical, every property that belongs to one of them belongs to the other. Basic Ingredient and Methods of Attack / Defence Cycle in Cyber Forensics Investigations (That Prosecution / Defence Must Establish and Substantiate Before Court): Possession, Contents, and Networking Possession: Control, Custody and Knowledge Contents of Electronic Evidence: Disclosure, Discovery and Admissibility Networking: Local Area Network (LAN), Wide Area Network (WAN), Internet and Broadbands, Satellite and Wireless Comms and etc. Categories Anti Cyber Forensics Ixion is a professional theme designed with schools, non-profits, and organizations in mind. In a single click, translate your site content into 100 languages. The second annual WordCamp US will be held in Philadelphia, PA, on December 2-4. Get your ticket now Millions of new, easy to remember. blog domains are available for your blog, for the first time ever. Matt Sweeny, a blogger and web and marketing designer in Wisconsin, builds his clients039 websites on WordPress. 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